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The American food system presents a complex intersection of some of the most critical 
environmental and health concerns of the modern day, creating unique challenges for regulators. 
Regulatory bodies face a complicated and ever-evolving system in which the public health 
impact and economic stakes are high — a system that must be carefully balanced when 
responding to new evidence of risk. Nevertheless, regulation of the food system remains 
understudied by political scientists.  
 The challenges and complexities of the food system are no more evident than in the 
animal feed industry, where ingredients are grown, rendered, manufactured, and processed by a 
diverse and geographically dispersed set of producers, and combined with pharmaceuticals 
designed to promote growth, increase feed efficiency, and prevent disease in food-producing 
animals. Some of these pharmaceuticals are added to medicated feeds at the mills and distributed 
to farmers by feed companies, while others are available for livestock producers to purchase over 
the counter and add to feed premixes, or via prescription by a veterinarian. Because many feed 
ingredients and recipes are considered proprietary information, little information is available to 
those outside the industry regarding the origin and composition of animal feed. Efforts to 
regulate animal feed ingredients are complicated not only by the complexity of the industry and 
the feed itself, but also by the diverse set of political and regulatory actors involved.  
This paper examines the regulatory challenges posed by the food system by taking an in-
depth look at the regulatory history behind a component of animal feed that has faced intense 
scientific and political scrutiny for decades: the routine use of subtherapeutic doses of antibiotic 
drugs. This paper pieces together the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of 




commercialization of the first antibiotic feed supplement and early concerns about antibiotic 
resistance, and ending with FDA’s most recent regulatory action on this issue in 2015. A 
longitudinal case study of this subject allows for a thorough examination of FDA’s behavior on a 
single issue over time, and tells the story of a practice that has garnered a great deal of attention 
by politicians, scientists, industry actors, regulators, and the press at times, but which has largely 
been told in bits and pieces. By developing this case historically, this paper sheds light on the 
key factors that affect FDA decision-making, focusing on how FDA weighs the costs and 
benefits of an action based on internal and external pressures, and how the agency decides to 
substitute actions that are more informal or formal based on this cost/benefit calculus. I examine 
in close detail the significant moments in FDA’s decision-making in order to analyze the 
influence of various stakeholders, as well as the political and budgetary costs of a potential 
action, on the agency at these crucial points. Studying the agency’s shifting calculus over the 
course of several decades allows us to draw conclusions about how FDA makes decisions in this 
complex political, regulatory, and scientific landscape. Analysis of this case indicates that FDA’s 
ability to regulate the food system is severely constrained by its need to limit political and 
budgetary costs by responding to the needs of a diverse set of stakeholders, leading to long 
delays in addressing health risks, such as antibiotic resistance. These conclusions have important 
implications for those who wish to stimulate or prevent agency action on this issue or others; a 
deeper understanding of the factors that motivate FDA’s behavior can allow stakeholders to 
more effectively influence regulatory outcomes. 
This paper is divided into four chapters. The first supplies the context for the case study 
by providing background on the animal feed industry and its regulation, including FDA’s 




responsibilities of other agencies participating in animal feed regulation. The second chapter 
addresses theories of regulatory behavior and explains the theoretical framework of agency 
decision-making that will be employed in the examination of the case. The third chapter delves 
into the regulatory history of the use of subtherapeutic levels of antibiotics in animal feed, 
applying the theory from chapter two to analyze FDA’s decision-making on the issue over the 
past several decades. The fourth chapter summarizes the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
case and the lessons that can be learned about how and why FDA and other agencies make 
regulatory decisions in the context of complex political, economic, and scientific environments. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: REGULATION IN CONTEXT: ANIMAL FEED AND ITS REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 FDA’s regulation of the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed takes place in a 
larger context that poses many challenges for the agency. The food system comprises many 
complicated industries and actors, particularly in the realm of food animal production and the 
animal feed industry. This context is further complicated by the patchwork regulatory structure 
in which the food system is situated. This chapter aims to place the ensuing case in the broader 
context of the complex food system FDA must navigate by providing background about the 
animal feed industry and its regulation. 
 
The Animal Feed Industry 
 
 The study of animal feed poses many challenges for researchers, mostly due to the lack of 
publicly available information on feed ingredients, formulation, and sales. Little data is collected 




feed formulations, and virtually no chemical or biological testing is done on the finished 
products.1 As a result, information on feed content is incomplete, and relies on previous studies 
and the limited data available. 
 One reason for the paucity of information surrounding animal feed is that much of the 
specific data on types and amounts of ingredients is considered proprietary information of the 
feed industry. The U.S. feed industry is a major supplier of animal feed globally, producing 173 
million metric tons of feed in 2014, which represents 17 percent of the total global feed 
production.2 The animal agriculture industry as a whole contributed $371 billion to GDP and 
1.98 million jobs in 2013, making it a major player in the U.S. economy.3 The animal 
pharmaceutical industry, which manufactures a wide range of products for agricultural use, 
including feed-grade antibiotics, is also a powerful economic force. In 2010, these companies 
sold $6.8 billion in total animal health products in the U.S. alone.4 Many of the top animal 
pharmaceutical producers are owned by the biggest players in the pharmaceutical industry as a 
whole, including Novartis, Bayer, and Merck.5 The animal pharmaceutical industry is 
represented by the Animal Health Institute, which has been an active player in the regulatory 
battle over animal antibiotics for decades.  
In the U.S., the feed industry is represented by the American Feed Industry Association 
(AFIA), with more than 75 percent of commercial feed in the U.S. produced by its members.6 
The industry comprises a number of different types of suppliers, including rendering plants, 
																																																								
1 Amy R. Sapkota et al., “What do we feed to food-production animals? A review of animal feed ingredients and 
their potential impacts on human health,” Environmental Health Perspectives 115.5 (2007): 667. 
2 International Feed Industry Federation, International Feed Industry Federation Annual Report, 2014/15.  
3 American Feed Industry Association, “Feed Industry Statistics.” http://www.afia.org/feedindustrystats.  
4 Animal Health Institute, “Industry Statistics: Animal Medicines by the Numbers.” http://www.ahi.org/about-
animal-medicines/industry-statistics/.  
5 Animal Health Institute, “Member Organization.” http://healthyanimals.org/members/.  




grain elevators, farmers, distillers, and non-food industries.7 Feed is produced primarily in three 
types of facilities: commercial plants that produce feed for sale, integrated operations that 
produce feed for their own animals, and cooperative facilities owned jointly by farmers to 
produce feed for their animals.8 In 2015, the FDA reported that there were 6,012 total feed mills 
in the U.S., with 1,005 facilities producing medicated feed.9 Raw ingredients for commercial 
mills come from a variety of different sources, typically purchased through brokers who procure 
ingredients from farmers, elevators, and processors.10 Because of the fragmented and varied 
nature of industry players, it is difficult to gather accurate information on ingredient sourcing and 
processing. 
 Over the past several decades, the animal feed industry has changed dramatically, largely 
related to the industrialization of animal agriculture as a whole. The driving factor of these 
changes has been an economic motivation to bring animals used for human food up to the 
desired weight as quickly and inexpensively as possible.11 Because feed costs are a huge portion 
of most livestock operations’ overall expenditures, there are significant incentives to bring down 
the cost of feed. In the poultry industry, for example, feed costs make up nearly 70 percent of 
total broiler production costs, making feed efficiency a central concern.12 Innovation in feed 
ingredients and feeding practices, as well as the availability of scientifically formulated feed 
products, have improved feed efficiency dramatically over the past several decades. The 
concentration and intensification of animal agriculture as a whole has led to several structural 
																																																								
7 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals: A Resource on Ingredients, the 
Industry, and Regulation by Lisa Y. Lefferts, Margaret Kucharski, Shawn McKenzie, and Polly Walker (Baltimore, 
MD 2007), 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Feed Industry Statistics.” http://www.afia.org/feedindustrystats. 
10 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 5. 
11 Ibid.  





trends in the feed industry in recent years, including increased production of feed concentrates 
and a trend towards larger, more integrated plants.13 The trend of consolidation in livestock 
production has been mirrored by a concentration in feed production both geographically and 
economically, with a large number of acquisitions and mergers occurring in the past two decades 
as the industry shifted away from the smaller, decentralized operations of the 1970s and 1980s.14 
By 2003, the top three feed manufacturers in U.S. made up 20 percent of the market.15 Increased 
concentration has been accompanied by vertical integration, particularly in the poultry industry, 
where major firms often have massive, in-house feed mills inside their concentrated feeding 
operations.16  
 Another significant trend in the industry is the increased use of antibiotics and other 
growth-promoting substances in feed, which is driven by economic incentives to increase feed 
efficiency and is linked more broadly to the intensification and concentration of livestock 
operations over the past few decades. Because livestock operations have become increasingly 
confined, producers face increased risk of pathogens that can spread through a large number of 
hosts at a rapid pace due to the crowding and the presence of animal waste in these facilities.17 
As a result, it has become common practice to administer antibiotics for disease prevention, often 
at subtherapeutic levels.18 Though the line between therapeutic and subtherapeutic doses of 
antibiotics is not always clear, subtherapeutic use refers to the administration of antibiotics at a 
dosage less than that which would be required to treat disease. Antibiotics have also become 
common feed ingredients for poultry, swine, and cattle to increase feed efficiency and promote 
																																																								
13 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 6. 
14 Ibid.; Vincent Amanor-Boadu and Kara Ross, Industry Trend Report: Animal Feed Manufacturing, (May 2011). 
15 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 6. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ellen K. Silbergeld, Jay Graham, and Lance B. Price, “Industrial Food Animal Production, Antimicrobial 
Resistance, and Human Health.” Annual Review of Public Health (2008) 29: 153. 




growth.19 Modern livestock feed typically contains several other ingredients specifically targeted 
at growth promotion and feed efficiency, including metal compounds such as organoarsenicals in 
poultry feed.20 According to the feed industry, the inclusion of these ingredients in feed has been 
a major factor in the significant improvements in feed efficiency that have occurred over the past 
fifty years.21  
 While ingredients targeted at improving feed efficiency have cut costs for livestock 
producers by reducing the amount of feed they need to purchase to achieve the same growth 
results, the feed industry has also looked to new sources of protein, roughage, and nutrients to 
cut costs. As a result, waste from various other industries as well as from animals has become an 
increasingly important component of animal feed.22 The use of waste byproducts, often referred 
to as “recycling,” has long been a practice of commercial feed production,23 but trends in animal 
agriculture have driven feed producers to rely on rendering products, animal waste, and 
byproducts from a variety of industries as ingredient sources.24 The use of animal waste has been 
driven in part by the intensification of animal agriculture, as confined operations can no longer 
only rely on local croplands to absorb the large quantities of waste produced by these facilities. 
Thus, producers have seen the use of waste in animal feed as an economical alternative to its use 
as fertilizer.25 The following section provides a more detailed discussion of these “recycled” 
ingredients.  
 Recent trends in the animal feed industry are linked to the intensification of animal 
agriculture over the past several decades. Demand for commercial feed blends and faster growth 
																																																								
19 Silbergeld et al. (2008): 153. 
20 Sapkota et al. (2007): 665. 
21 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 6. 
22 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 7. 
23 Sarah Muirhead, “Structure of Feed Industry Has Evolved to Meet Needs of Producers, Consumers; From a User 
of By-products to a Science-based Industry,” Feedstuffs 75.34 (2003): 14.  





have led to a feed industry that is more concentrated economically and geographically than at 
any other time over the past century, and feed is formulated by combining a careful balance of 
ingredients to optimize feed efficiency and growth promotion. Understanding these trends in 
feed production and animal agriculture is critical to appreciating the challenges facing agencies 
charged with regulating this complex and evolving industry. 
 
An Overview of Animal Feed Ingredients 
 Animal feed is formulated using a wide range of ingredients from diverse sources, and 
little official information is collected on the nature and amounts of these ingredients. Part of the 
challenge in regulating this industry lies in the complexity of animal feed formulation. This 
section will provide a basic overview of the types of ingredients used in modern animal feed to 
provide context for an analysis of how ingredients are regulated.  
 Figure 1 provides a summary of the major sources of ingredients for animal feed and 
gives several examples, though it is not a comprehensive list. Most substantial ingredients are of 
either plant or animal origin, though they are derived from a wide variety of sources. Many 
ingredients are byproducts of commercial production in other industries, which poses challenges 
for regulators seeking to understand risk pathways. For example, distiller grain byproducts from 
corn ethanol fuel production are widely used in animal feed, and often contain the antibiotics 
used in ethanol production to manage bacterial outbreaks in fermentation vats, according to FDA 
testing.26  Because distiller grains are not recognized from a regulatory perspective as a source of 
antibiotics in animal feed, they are not considered when determining the types of allowable 
dosages of antibiotics placed directly in feed. Similar concerns related to pesticide and drug 
residues accompany the use of wastes from other industries. 
																																																								




Figure 1: Overview of Animal Feed Ingredients27 
Origin Types of Ingredients 
Plant  • Grains (corn, sorghum, wheat, barley, oats); 
• Forage (Alfalfa meal and hay); 
• Grain by-products, including distiller grains, brewer’s yeast, corn gluten, 
etc.; 
• Processed meals and cakes, such as from soybean, peanut, canola, 
cottonseed; 
• Miscellaneous (dried fruit pulp, molasses, almond hulls and ground shells, 
banana peels). 
Animal • Rendered animal protein (from slaughtered animals or other dead or 
diseased animals), including meat by-products, hydrolyzed poultry feather, 
meat and bone meal, blood meal, unborn calf carcasses, ensiled paunch; 
• Animal Waste (dried poultry litter, dried ruminant waste, dried swine 
waste); 
• Marine by-products (fish meal, fish oil, fish liver and glandular meal); 
• Dairy products (dried cow milk, casein, whey products); 
Mixed • Fats and oils (animal fat, vegetable oil, hydrolyzed fats); 
• Restaurant food waste (edible food waste, including plate waste, collected 
from restaurants, dairies, and cafeterias); 
• Contaminated or adulterated food (food originally intended for humans that 
has become adulterated with rodent, roach, or bird excreta and that has been 







• Non-protein nitrogen (urea, anhyrdrous ammonia); 
• Polyethylene plastic in pellet form (used as roughage substitute); 
• Minerals (including mineral mixes) and vitamins and vitamin-containing 
oils (shark oil, cod liver oil); 
• Probiotics (direct-fed microorganisms, such as Aspergillis niger, Bacillus 
subtilis, Bifidobacterium animalis, Enterococcus faecium, yeast) and 
enzymes (lipase, pepsin); 
• Flavors (aloe vera gel, ginger, capsicum, fennel) 
• “Generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) ingredients 
• Neutraceuticals and other dietary supplements 
 
The use of ingredients of animal origin adds another layer of complexity for regulators, 
as this provides an additional pathway for potentially unrecognized or unwanted substances in 
feed. Drugs or other ingredients used under certain circumstances for a particular animal could 
																																																								
27 Information adapted from Sapkota et al. (2007) and  Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food 




get into the feed of another if that substance is present in the animal matter used in its feed, 
whether it accumulates in the animal’s body or is excreted in its waste. Additionally, poultry feed 
is often spread or spilled on the floor of feeding operations, such that it becomes mixed with the 
litter that is later used in feed for other animals. The complexity of sources and ingredients used 
in modern feed formulation presents many challenges for regulators in determining which 




 The regulation of animal feed in the U.S. involves a number of federal, state, and industry 
actors. FDA is the primary agency at the federal level charged with animal feed regulation, but a 
number of other federal agencies, state officials, and industry groups carry out regulatory 
activities as well. In order to understand the factors that affect FDA’s regulatory actions, it is 
critical to understand the regulatory context in which FDA operates. This section aims to provide 
an overview of the regulatory landscape for animal feed and identify any gaps or overlaps in this 
system. 
  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act charges FDA with regulating 
animal feed ingredients and additives, and this responsibility is handled by FDA’s Center for 
Veterinary Medicine (CVM).28 Animal feed and feed ingredients are regulated as foods, food 
additives, or drugs based on the properties and the claims made about the product.29 Feed or feed 
ingredients regulated as “food” are considered safe, and thus do not require pre-market 
approval.30 This category includes ingredients such as grains and hays, as well as some 
																																																								
28 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (1938). 





adulterated human food. Feed ingredients classified as drugs under the Act face more rigorous 
regulation. A feed ingredient is classified as a drug based on its intended use, which is 
determined based on claims made about that product on the product’s approved label.31 
Ingredients that claim to prevent, treat, cure, or mitigate disease, or affect the structure or 
function of the body (including increasing leanness, growth, or efficiency of gain) are considered 
drugs under the Act.32 Because this designation is based solely on claims made about the 
product, ingredients that contain drug residues but are not intended for such a purpose are not 
classified as drugs. As a result, feed ingredients such as distiller grains, which often have 
significant traces of antibiotics, are regulated as “food” and not seen as a source of a drug that is 
more restrictively regulated. 
Under section 512(a)(1) of the FD&C Act, FDA must approve all new animal drugs 
before they can be marketed. In order to approve a new animal drug use, FDA must make a 
determination of safety based on a weighing of risks and benefits, and establish that there is a 
“reasonable certainty of no harm” with regard to food produced from treated animals under the 
intended conditions of use.33 Section 512(d)(1)(B) explicitly prohibits FDA from approving a 
drug use if the evidence “does not show that such drug is safe for use.”34 If new evidence 
becomes available after approval that indicates that the drug use is not safe, FDA is required to 
notify the sponsor, provide opportunity for a hearing, and, if the sponsor fails to provide 
																																																								
31 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 8. 
32U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, “General Review and Enforcement Policies: 
Regulating Animal Foods with Drug Claims,” in Center for Veterinary Medicine Program Policy and Procedures 
Manual (1998).  






sufficient evidence of safety at this hearing, FDA must issue an order withdrawing approval for 
that drug use.35  
 Ingredients not classified as food or drugs are regulated as feed additives unless the 
ingredient is generally recognized as safe (GRAS).36 Approved food additives have met the 
criteria for safety based on a review of available scientific evidence, and are subject to limited 
regulation.37 A substance may be considered GRAS if it has been commonly used in feed prior to 
January 1, 1958 or based on an evaluation of available scientific evidence by experts.38 The FDA 
does not publish a full list of approved feed additives or GRAS ingredients, but the most 
complete list can be found in the Association of American Feed Control Officials (AAFCO) 
Official Publication.39 
 In addition to approving and regulating feed ingredients, the FDA also regulates all drug 
use in animals producing food for human consumption, inspects feed mills producing medicated 
feed, and monitors labeling and marketing materials.40 The FDA can carry out its regulatory 
activities by using a number of tools, including formal rulemaking, adjudication, and informal 
guidance. As in many of their other regulatory areas, the FDA has increasingly relied on 
informal guidance to carry out its regulatory activities in animal feed in recent years. While 
informal guidance has several advantages for the FDA, particularly its relatively low cost 
compared to rulemaking or adjudication and the greater flexibility it allows, it is non-binding and 
thus does not carry the force and effect of law in the way that more formal procedures do.41 
																																																								
35 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §512(e)(1) (1938). 
36 “Animal Food & Feeds: Ingredients & Additives,” U.S. Food and Drug Admnistration. 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Products/AnimalFoodFeeds/IngredientsAdditives/default.htm.  
37 Determination of Food Additive Status, 21 C.F.R. §570.38. 
38 Eligibility for classification as generally recognized as safe (GRAS), 21 C.F.R. §570.30. 
39U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Food and Drug 
Administration and the Association of American Feed Control Officials, MOU 225-07-7001 (2015).   
40 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 9. 




FDA’s choice of regulatory tools and a weighing of their costs and benefits will be discussed 
more fully in subsequent chapters. 
 Several other federal agencies are also involved in issues related to animal feed. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) is not directly charged with regulating animal feed, but its 
regulatory activities involving livestock and poultry often have an impact on feed. The USDA 
monitors both imported and domestic animals and animal products as part of its mandate, 
through the USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and the USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), both of which can involve animal feed. USDA regulations 
were particularly important in the animal feed industry during the early 2000s, when there was 
concern about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in cattle and the potential for this disease to 
be spread through animal feed.42 The USDA’s Agricultural Research Service also conducts many 
activities relevant to animal feed, particularly looking at feed contaminants and the use of 
antimicrobials.43 While much of this research is relevant to the FDA’s regulatory activities, 
interagency coordination on animal feed has often proved challenging. 
 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is also involved in the regulation of 
animal feed, primarily through its jurisdiction over pesticide use and waste management. The 
EPA sets tolerances and tests residues for pesticides used in crops for animal feed, including 
antimicrobial pesticides.44 However, an animal feed containing an animal drug is not considered 
a pesticide, and is solely regulated by the FDA.45 The EPA is also charged with regulating 
environmental and public health concerns related to Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), 
																																																								
42 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 9. 
43 Ibid.   
44 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Pesicide Registration: Data Requirements,” 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/data-requirements.  




including waste management and feeding practices.46 In partnership with USDA, EPA has 
published guidelines for AFOs, including strategies for feed management practices to reduce the 
amount of nutrients in manure and regulations for feed mills that are integrated into AFOs.47  
 Though FDA has primary responsibility for animal feed and its ingredients, USDA and 
EPA both play important roles in this area. From a stakeholder perspective, all three agencies are 
involved in various stages of the production and use of animal feed, and the feed and livestock 
industries must interact with regulators from all three agencies. Additionally, because research 
on issues related to animal feed, as well as residue testing on animal feed and human food 
products, is spread among different agencies, inter-agency coordination to handle both overlaps 
and gaps in regulatory activity remains a challenge that affects FDA actions in this area. 
 
State Regulation  
 States are also involved in the regulation of animal feed in partnership with federal 
agencies and industry organizations. State feed officials are members of the AAFCO, though 
their activities vary based on state regulation. State officials may review animal feed through 
product registration or licensing, and some states also have labeling requirements that feed 
manufacturers must meet.48 States and FDA officials also monitor and inspect feed mills, and the 
AAFCO has developed a model feed safety program development guide that is used by officials 
in various states to create and manage a feed safety program.49 State and federal coordination is 
largely accomplished through the AAFCO, which works with both the FDA and state regulatory 
bodies. 
																																																								
46 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs): Regulations, Guidance, Policy, and 
Funding,” http://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos-regulations-guidance-policy-and-funding.  
47 U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Unified National Strategy for Animal 
Feeding Operations (Washington, DC 1999). 
48 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 10. 






 Industry organizations and initiatives have played a significant role in animal feed 
regulation, particularly due to the complex and technical nature of many of the industry’s 
practices and products. Industry groups both organize the diverse set of actors in animal feed 
production, including commercial and integrated feed manufacturers, ingredient suppliers, and 
equipment manufacturers, and coordinate partnerships with FDA, USDA, and state regulators.50 
This section will provide a brief summary of a few major actors as they relate to regulatory 
activities, though it is by no means a comprehensive list.  
 The AFIA has played a major role in developing industry guidelines for safe feed 
production, as well as in coordinating with regulators and advocating for industry interests at the 
federal and state levels. The AFIA developed the “Safe Feed/Safe Food” certification program 
for feed manufactures, ingredient suppliers, integrated producers, meat producers, and feed 
purchasers that contains many guidelines related to record-keeping, product tracing, and facility 
management and is widely used in the industry.51 The AFIA also helps manufacturers and 
consumers understand FDA regulations and AAFCO Good Management Practices, and develops 
guides for industry actors to help them adapt to changes in regulation, including the 
implementation of the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011.52 
 Other industry groups are also active in developing voluntary guidance and certification 
programs in partnership with regulators and researchers. The Animal Protein Producers Industry, 
for example, developed a third-party certification program to help manufacturers meet FDA 
requirements on animal proteins used in feed, as well as a salmonella testing, education, and 
																																																								
50 American Feed Industry Association, “About,” http://www.afia.org/about.  
51 Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Feed for Food-Producing Animals, 11; American Feed Industry 
Association, “Safe Feed/Safe Food Certification Program,” http://safefeedsafefood.org/main/home.cfm. 




reduction program in partnership with several land-grant universities, USDA, and FDA.53 State 
associations, most notably in California, have developed similar quality assurance and training 
programs for feed producers.54 
 
International Regulatory Activities 
 Because there is considerable variation in animal feed regulation throughout the world, 
particularly when it comes to drugs allowable in animal feed, the U.S. participates in some 
international activities related to animal feed to facilitate trade. The Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), an international group that regulates food standards, develops guidelines for 
various aspects of food production that are recognized under international trade agreements.55 
The U.S. participates in the CAC, but does not necessarily follow the practices outlined by the 
commission. In the realm of animal feed, the CAC has several subsidiary bodies that deal with 
feed safety and feeding practices, most notably the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Codex Task Force 
on Animal Feeding, the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Food, and the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants.56 These groups have published various 
codes addressing the development of feed safety systems for food-producing animals, feed 
contaminants, and antibiotic use, though feed practices in the U.S. deviate from these guidelines 
in many ways. In 2004, the CAC adopted a code stating that antibiotics should not be used in 
animal feed for growth promotion purposes without a public health safety assessment, though the 
details of such an assessment were left to individual countries.57 The World Health Organization 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization have also taken action on animal feed in the past, 
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particularly during the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy outbreaks.58 Because the U.S. is a 
large exporter of animal feed, international regulation has the potential to play a significant role 
in influencing U.S. policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 Animal feed regulation in the U.S. is characterized by a number of federal, state, and 
international actors that deal with a diverse group of stakeholders. The regulatory landscape is 
most complex in areas where there are visible public health concerns, especially in dealing with 
the use of antimicrobials in feed. As the primary federal agency charged with regulating animal 
feed and its ingredients (including animal pharmaceuticals), FDA is responsible for leading any 
action on animal feed production or use, but faces challenges in coordinating with other federal 
agencies involved in animal agriculture, as well as state officials and industry groups. As a result, 
the regulatory landscape influences FDA action, affecting the information available to FDA, the 
pressure FDA faces to act on a particular issue, and the flexibility and constraints on this action. 
 
CHAPTER 2: HOW DOES FDA DECIDE? A THEORETICAL  
FRAMEWORK FOR AGENCY BEHAVIOR 
 
 In deciphering and explaining FDA behavior, two key questions must be addressed. First, 
how does FDA decide when to take regulatory action on a particular issue, and what are the 
various factors that affect this decision? Second, when it does decide to act, how does the agency 
determine which regulatory action to take at a given time? In order to answer these two 
questions, we must first address FDA’s objective function.  
																																																								




 The objective function represents the agency’s ultimate motivation, which drives its 
behavior. Prominent models of agency behavior assume a number of different functions, and no 
single objective function has emerged in the literature on agency decision-making. An approach 
focusing on managerial discretion assumes that agencies seek to maximize their budgets,59 while 
public interest theory would assume that agencies seek to maximize the welfare of regulatory 
beneficiaries.60 The “congressional dominance” theory, which first became prominent during the 
mid-1980s, sees an agency’s primary objective as the optimization of the preferences of 
congressional committees that oversee the agency.61 Another theory prominent among political 
economists of the Chicago school assumes the agency is “captured” by the regulated industry, 
and thus its function is to maximize the industry’s preferences.62  
Each of these theories, however, limits the agency by assuming it responds to only one 
set of interests based on its predetermined objective, which neglects other potential pressures 
influencing its behavior. The external signals model of agency behavior, first presented by 
Joskow,63 later developed by Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington64 and applied extensively to 
FDA’s behavior by Olson,65 allows for the possibility that agency officials respond to all the 
preferences posited by these theories. In the external signals theory, an agency’s function is to 
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maximize positive feedback from external sources in order to maintain its autonomy.66 By 
avoiding negative feedback and seeking positive feedback from a wide variety of external 
stakeholders, the agency ensures that it has the political support necessary to take a given action 
among the relevant groups that would otherwise be able to create “hassles” for the agency and 
decrease its autonomy.67  
In explaining and predicting when an agency68 decides to act and which action it chooses 
to take, the external signals model focuses on the tradeoffs that the agency faces, accounting for 
positive and negative feedback from various external groups as well as the budgetary costs of 
agency actions. Instead of assuming, based on a narrow objective function, that the agency 
responds only to feedback from a particular stakeholder group, this model allows for a more 
dynamic decision-making process in which the agency reacts to diverse and changing feedback. 
Under the external signals model, the agency is engaged in a continuous process of weighing 
positive feedback from external stakeholders against the political costs of negative feedback 
from other outside groups, as well as the budgetary costs of the various regulatory actions they 
are able to take.69 Because the preferences of external groups shift and the political environment 
is constantly evolving, an agency’s calculus regarding a particular issue changes over time, 
providing opportunities for substitution of one regulatory action for another.70 For example, if 
the agency receives a substantial amount of negative feedback that outweighs any positive 
feedback on a given regulatory action, political costs of taking that action are high. As a result, 
the agency may not wish to spend a great deal of budgetary resources to take the action, 
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particularly if it requires procedural steps that consume substantial time and resources. Instead, it 
may choose not to take the action, to postpone the action, or to substitute the action for another 
that is less formal and resource-intensive, and perhaps that will draw less negative political 
feedback. Because this model allows for the agency to change its behavior on a particular issue 
over time, given shifting costs and benefits, the external signals model is better suited for a 
longitudinal case study of agency behavior than other, more static models. 
Political costs, defined as negative feedback from external stakeholders, can come from a 
variety of actors and provide resistance for the agency in several ways. In the case of animal 
pharmaceutical regulation by FDA, the pharmaceutical companies tend to resist any additional 
restrictions or regulation, as this can disrupt their operations or, in the most extreme case, 
permanently take their product off the market. The food animal production industry, which 
includes cattle, swine, and poultry producers as well as a variety of other related agricultural 
interests, also tends to resist regulation of pharmaceuticals for food-producing animals, though 
their response is often affected by the current practices they employ. For example, while large 
swine producers might oppose regulation of a drug they use widely in feed for disease 
prevention, small producers might have different management practices that effectively prevent 
disease without the drug, and they also might not be able to afford a medicated feed premix. As a 
result, small producers would have an advantage if the drug were restricted or banned. 
Furthermore, if the regulation is limited to a drug used only in swine production, then poultry 
and cattle producers might not resist the regulation, as an increase in the price of pork could give 
them an advantage in the market. Nevertheless, if new regulation sets a precedent for restrictions 
on a broad class of drug uses or indicates a shift towards more active intervention in the industry 




apply pressure to FDA through Congress, but they can also exert influence directly by expressing 
preferences formally and informally during the rulemaking process.71 
Regulatory beneficiaries and their advocates can also be a source of political costs. In the 
case of antibiotic regulation in food-producing animals, consumers and groups that advocate for 
public health, the environment, and public interest or consumer issues can create political costs 
when they believe FDA is not adequately protecting human health. These groups are also able to 
provide political benefits in the form of positive feedback to offset the political costs created by 
those opposed to regulation. These groups tend to be at their most powerful when there is a lapse 
in regulation that causes a “scandal” and gains media attention, as FDA is likely to respond 
quickly to avoid reduced autonomy in the future. However, advocates for regulatory 
beneficiaries tend to be at a disadvantage when it comes to organization and resources for legal 
challenges and lobbying.72 
Though Congress can sometimes act as an independent source of political costs and 
benefits, more often Congress acts as a conduit for concerns of other stakeholders to be 
transmitted to FDA. If stakeholders provide negative feedback that garners attention, Congress is 
able to apply pressure on their behalf through oversight of FDA and in the appropriations 
process, by threatening to cut FDA’s budget or allocating funds for a specific purpose in order to 
direct FDA action. Negative feedback can also lead to procedural constraints or legal challenges, 
which are undesirable for FDA because they consume resources that could otherwise be used to 
carry out the agency’s goals. 
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Budgetary costs can be increased by procedural and legal challenges driven by negative 
feedback, but they also factor independently into FDA’s decision-making. Formal rulemaking is 
guided by statutes that contain extensive procedural requirements, including scientific 
evaluation, an economic impact study, advanced notice of proposed rules, public comment 
periods, opportunities for hearings, and ultimately an evidentiary hearing before an 
administrative law judge. These procedures, along with the adjudication and enforcement 
proceedings that come along with formal rulemaking, consume time and budgetary resources, 
making formal rulemaking an expensive undertaking for the agency. Stakeholders are also able 
to hold up the rulemaking process at various stages by requesting additional hearings or 
evidence, submitting substantive comments that FDA must evaluate and address, or by 
challenging the final decision. These challenges make the prospect of formal rulemaking even 
more daunting for an agency with limited resources, as they can consume FDA’s manpower and 
funding for years. The threat of legal action from the regulated industry has also become an 
increasingly strong deterrent from formal rulemaking over the last few decades.73 However, the 
advantage of formal rulemaking is that it creates binding rules that are legally enforceable.  
FDA can also employ informal regulatory actions, such as guidance documents, which 
are much less costly because they do not require the extensive procedures and opportunities for 
public comment mandated by the formal rulemaking process.74 This also makes them more 
flexible, as FDA is able to respond more quickly to changes in technology or scientific 
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understanding. However, these actions are nonbinding and thus unenforceable.75 The budgetary 
costs of an action play a significant role in FDA’s decision to initiate regulatory action and in 
determining whether they will take formal or informal measures. Changing feedback can 
incentivize FDA to substitute one type of action for another.76  
Another key factor that is not incorporated into the external signals theory, but which 
plays a central role in the story of animal antibiotics regulation, is the availability and strength of 
the scientific evidence. Because the FD&C Act requires FDA to evaluate scientific evidence 
regarding the safety of a drug as part of its regulatory duties, science places a constraint on 
agency action, and can be used as a tool by other stakeholders to delay or force action. The 
establishment of strong scientific evidence is a prerequisite for FDA to move forward with 
formal rulemaking, as the agency does not wish to waste resources attempting to overcome the 
procedural hurdles if the action will ultimately be blocked by a scientific challenge. Like external 
signals from stakeholders, the body of scientific evidence evolves over time, which can change 
FDA’s calculus.  
Because the focus of this paper is FDA behavior, the strategies and decision-making of 
external stakeholders, including Congress, are not analyzed extensively and a complete 
examination of their behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. Additionally, though the 
motivations of individuals within FDA (including political appointees that change with each 
administration and may advance their own agendas) likely play a role in shaping FDA’s 
behavior, here we examine the agency as a single entity and do not analyze the role of internal 
politics. The present goal is to understand how external signals affect FDA’s decision-making. 
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Future research on the topic should consider evaluating the impact of internal actors and 
changing presidential administrations as an additional factor affecting FDA’s regulatory behavior 
in the food system. 
The next chapter takes up a longitudinal case study of FDA’s regulation of subtherapeutic 
antibiotic use in animal agriculture in the years between 1970 and 2015. By piecing together the 
key moments in FDA’s regulatory record on this issue, this paper builds a comprehensive history 
of how FDA allowed the drugs to become incorporated into animal feeding practices, and 
subsequently dealt with the human health hazard posed by the emerging threat of antibiotic 
resistance. In telling this history, trends in FDA’s behavior are identified and explained through 
an analysis of the external signals the agency was receiving at the time. A longitudinal study of a 
single issue provides a unique opportunity to see how FDA’s behavior changed over time, as the 
political environment evolved and the balance of costs and benefits shifted. 
 
CHAPTER 3: A REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE SUBTHERAPEUTIC USE OF 
ANTIBIOTICS IN ANIMAL FEED 
 
Antibiotics in Animal Feed: The Early Years 
 FDA’s long history with antibiotics in animal agriculture began in 1949 at a tetracycline 
manufacturing plant owned by American Cyanamid Corporation, located on the Pearl River just 
outside New York City.77 In these early years of mass antibiotic production, only about five 
percent of the tetracycline grown on grain mashes could be extracted, and the waste was dumped 
into the river. After noticing that the fish swimming downriver from the plant were larger than 
average, a biochemist named Thomas Jukes set out to experiment on animals in the lab. Jukes 
																																																								




discovered that after being fed this mash, chicks grew 20 percent faster than those without the 
antibiotic supplement, and pigs, turkeys, and dairy calves in later experiments showed 
remarkable responses to the drugs as well.78  
Jukes’s finding was hailed as a “spectacular discovery” that farmers and scientists alike 
believed would hold great significance “for the survival of the human race in a world of 
dwindling resources and expanding populations.”79 Enthusiastic pharmaceutical companies raced 
to market this new discovery, and antibiotic feed supplements intended to improve growth and 
feed efficiency in a variety of food-producing animals were commercialized one year later, in 
1950.80 Researchers soon found that the antibiotics that promoted growth and increased feed 
efficiency also prevented and controlled disease in large groups of animals, which allowed 
farmers to keep animals confined indoors for longer periods with lower risk of fatal outbreaks.81 
As producers faced increased pressure to meet rising demand, the subtherapeutic use of 
antibiotics became widespread practice, creating the conditions for the confined, large-scale 
operations that dominate modern animal agriculture. 
 Not long after antibiotics became a common tool in animal agriculture, scientists and 
policymakers were becoming concerned about the problem of antibiotic resistance. By the early 
1960s, the scientific community was beginning to examine the occurrence and mechanisms of 
the development and transfer of resistance in bacteria, looking at antibiotic uses in human 
medicine as well as animal husbandry.82 After an outbreak of food poisoning in United Kingdom 
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that was caused by the spread of Salmonella typhimurium in dairy calves to humans, the British 
government appointed the Joint Committee on the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and 
Veterinary Medicine (often referred to as the Swann committee) to study the subtherapeutic use 
of antibiotics in animal feed.83 In November of 1969, the Swann committee presented its report 
to the British Parliament, which highlighted the potential human health hazard of the 
development of antibiotic resistance in bacteria in farm animals. This conclusion was reached 
after the committee found that most cases of nontyphoidal Salmonella infection in humans were 
transmitted through food, with farm animals as a significant source.84 The Swann committee 
recommended that animal antibiotics be separated into two classes: a “therapeutic” category, 
which would include tetracyclines and penicillins, among others, would only be permitted for 
therapeutic uses under a veterinary prescription, while those in the “feed” category would not be 
subject to such restrictions.85 In March of 1971, the British government carried out the 
recommendations of the Swann Report.86 
 FDA’s Science Advisory Committee reviewed the Swann Report and recommended that 
the Commissioner of Food and Drugs establish a task force to study the use of antibiotics in 
animal agriculture.87 In April of 1970, the Commissioner created FDA’s Task Force on the Use 
of Antibiotics in Animal Feeds, which included ten specialists on infectious disease and animal 
science from several agencies, including FDA, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), USDA, and 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as five consultants from universities and the 
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animal production and pharmaceutical industries.88 The task force focused on three areas of 
concern for its investigation: the human health hazard, the animal health hazard, and the efficacy 
of antibiotics in growth promotion.89 Two years later, the task force reported that it found that 
“the use of low-level antibiotics in animal feed for growth promotion and/or disease prophylaxis 
poses a potential danger to man.”90 This hazard was based on their conclusion that antibiotic use 
may promote both an increase in the reservoir of pathogenic bacteria in animals, and the 
development of resistance that can often be transferred to other bacteria and transmitted to 
man.91 Though the task force was not able to determine if a direct link existed between 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals and disease in man, they nevertheless recommended that 
antibiotics be categorized such that certain types could be reserved for human treatment, and thus 
limited in agricultural uses.92 The task force’s report contained safety and effectiveness 
guidelines and recommended that FDA prohibit antibiotics used in human medicine from being 
added to feed for growth promotion or disease prevention if the antibiotics failed to meet the 
proposed guidelines.93 
 In April of 1973, FDA took up the task force’s recommendations and published a 
Statement of Policy and Interpretation Regarding Animal Drugs and Medicated Feeds, in which 
FDA declared that it would withdraw any antibiotic-containing compounds unless the drug’s 
sponsors submitted data that established the product’s safety and effectiveness.94 FDA required 
sponsors to complete these studies under the criteria established by the task force and submit 
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data within two years to prove safety and efficacy.95 Reporting on the progress of this project and 
FDA’s current regulatory standpoint in 1975, Gerald Guest, who would become the director of 
FDA’s Bureau of Veterinary Medicine the following year, emphasized that future safety and 
efficacy considerations would be more demanding given the “present climate,” and said that 
FDA expected to make decisions on continued uses of certain antibiotics in feed by the following 
year.96 
 FDA’s early actions to assess the risks of antibiotic use in animal feed were prompted 
largely by the growing concern about antibiotic resistance within the scientific community, as 
well as by the policy changes in Great Britain as a result of the Swann Report, which garnered 
international attention. Between 1960 and 1970, the use of antibiotics in animal feeds increased 
six fold, and the practice had become a major topic of conversation in scientific and public health 
circles.97 Still, rather than taking swift action to protect against potential human health hazards 
like the British, FDA’s behavior at this stage was characterized by careful and deliberate 
information-gathering from scientific and industry experts on the task force in order to ensure a 
defensible basis for future action. In October 1973, just after the FDA had released its new policy 
adopting the task force’s recommendations, the World Health Organization (WHO), which had 
created a working group specifically to study the use of antibiotics in animal feed, recommended 
that antibiotics with therapeutic value not be used for growth promotion.98 In acting on the task 
force’s conclusions, FDA took its first step towards actual regulation of animal feed antibiotics, 
which soon gained the attention of the pharmaceutical and animal production industries, as well 
as Congress. 
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FDA Proposes Withdrawals for Penicillin and Tetracyclines 
   In June 1975, FDA created a subcommittee of the National Advisory Food and Drug 
Committee that was tasked with reviewing the evidence that had been submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies in response to FDA’s 1973 regulation, as well as other scientific 
evidence related to antibiotic resistance and the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. 
The subcommittee reviewed data on the use of tetracyclines, penicillin, and sulfaquinoxaline in 
animal feed, and submitted recommendations to the parent committee that would place 
significant limits on subtherapeutic uses of these three antibiotics. According to the 
subcommittee’s recommendations, all growth promotion and feed efficiency uses of penicillin 
would be discontinued, and penicillin could only be used for disease prevention where there 
were no effective substitutes available. The subcommittee also called for the termination of 
growth promotion and feed efficiency uses of tetracyclines where substitutes were available. For 
disease prevention, uses of both sulfaquinoxaline and tetracyclines were to be limited to periods 
with the greatest threat of animal disease.99 If adopted, these regulations would be the most 
significant restrictions on animal feed antibiotic use since their commercialization began 25 
years before. 
 The National Advisory Food and Drug Committee, FDA’s broad policy advisory 
committee, voted on January 24, 1977 to accept the subcommittee’s recommendations on 
penicillin and sulfaquinoxaline, but rejected their recommendations on tetracyclines. Instead, the 
committee voted to recommend to FDA that tetracyclines remain available for growth promotion 
and disease prevention uses without restriction.100 Though there was no formal statement from 
the committee on why this portion of the recommendation was reversed, an official from the U.S. 
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General Accounting Office (GAO, later renamed the Government Accountability Office) who 
investigated FDA’s actions on this issue said the committee was primarily concerned about such 
restrictions on tetracyclines due to their economic benefit to livestock production and the lack of 
effective substitutes available.101  
 Four months later, on April 15, 1977, FDA announced its decision to place restrictions on 
subtherapeutic animal feed uses of penicillin, tetracyclines, and sulfaquinoxaline in accordance 
with the subcommittee’s original recommendations.102 FDA initiated formal rulemaking 
proceedings to enact these restrictions, issuing a notice of opportunity for hearing in the Federal 
Register in August of 1977 for its proposal to withdraw approval for all animal feed uses of 
penicillin. This notice was shortly followed by another notice for its proposal to withdraw 
approval for certain subtherapeutic uses of tetracyclines.103 FDA stated that the grounds for 
withdrawal were that the drug uses had not been shown to be safe for human health under the 
requirements of the FD&C Act, and that there was also a lack of substantial evidence for the 
effectiveness for therapeutic use of penicillin.104 
 After FDA’s initial gathering and analysis of the evidence on the risk of antibiotic 
resistance associated with subtherapeutic use in animal feed, the agency initiated strong action in 
the form of formal rulemaking proceedings to implement the recommendations it received from 
the scientific community. By the time it announced the proposal to withdraw approval for 
subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and certain uses of tetracyclines, its actions were supported by 
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recommendations from the Swann committee, the FDA task force, the WHO, and the agency’s 
advisory subcommittee, as well as many other scientific organizations that had spoken on the 
issue. By waiting to take action until the evidence had piled up in its favor, FDA positioned itself 
strongly to defend against any attacks on its position. At the same time, FDA had yet to 
experience any vocal opposition from industry or Congress on this issue, lowering the political 
barriers to action. With overwhelming support from the recommendations of numerous 
independent scientific bodies and muted backlash thus far, FDA decided to initiate formal 
regulatory action to address antibiotic use in animal agriculture. 
 
Congress Intervenes to Block FDA Action 
 Immediately after publishing its proposal to withdraw approval for uses of penicillin and 
tetracyclines in 1977, FDA faced the strong backlash it had anticipated from industry and 
Congress, which constrained the regulatory options available to the agency. Less than a month 
after FDA published its notice, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House 
Commerce Committee held the first of what would eventually turn into many Congressional 
hearings on antibiotics in animal feed.105 During the hearing, FDA Commissioner Donald 
Kennedy was questioned extensively about FDA’s decision-making process on animal 
antibiotics, which some critics argued was too hasty and unsupported by sufficient evidence, 
while others questioned FDA for not acting earlier and more decisively. Rep. Henry Waxman, a 
Democrat from California, questioned Kennedy about why FDA did not act several years earlier 
when many had deemed the evidence sufficient, and suggested that FDA consider using its 
“imminent hazard” powers to avoid lengthy delays in the regulatory process. At the same time, 
Republican members and those representing rural districts emphasized the economic costs of 
																																																								




restricting subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics and urged the agency to delay action until more 
direct evidence was presented.106 Those who opposed FDA’s position focused on the fact that no 
direct link between a human illness and the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed had 
been established. They argued that without determining this direct link, it would be unwise to 
move forward with proposals to restrict the use of drugs that were beneficial to American 
farmers and consumers. 
 Examining FDA testimony in Congressional hearings provides a unique opportunity to 
hear directly from FDA officials on how agency decisions are made, a process that tends to be 
somewhat opaque to the public. Kennedy’s testimony in the 1977 hearing provided a strong 
public statement that FDA considered the hazard of antibiotic use in animal feed to be 
significant, and that there was “not any doubt…on the grounds of evidence” about the transfer of 
resistant microorganisms from livestock animals to humans working with the animals or their 
meat.107 When criticized for moving slowly to regulate this hazard, Kennedy also explained why 
FDA must proceed cautiously:  
“In defense of my colleagues, I would like to say that one of the real important questions 
here is if the evidence is good enough for us to write a document that will stand up. We 
know we are going to be challenged on actions like this. If we cannot make a strong case, 
it is often a poor expenditure of our resources.”108 
 
Kennedy’s statement summarizes several of the key factors playing into FDA’s calculus 
regarding whether, when, and how to act when regulating a complex and controversial issue. As 
FDA’s careful and deliberate process during the 1970s indicates, FDA knew that it would face 
challenges to its attempts to regulate antibiotics in animal feed, even though it had not 
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experienced serious opposition up to this point. Because formal rulemaking is extremely 
resource-intensive, Kennedy was aware that FDA must have the strongest possible case backed 
by convincing evidence before proceeding to avoid wasting time, money, and manpower on a 
rule that could be blocked by Congress or successfully challenged in court by the industry. In 
delaying action until their position was supported not only by the Swann Committee, the WHO, 
and their own task force, but also by the recommendations of the advisory committee that 
reviewed data submitted by the drugs’ sponsors, Kennedy hoped the agency’s case for 
rulemaking was strong enough to overcome opposition. 
 In the first Congressional hearing on antibiotics in animal feed, FDA’s position was 
supported by testimony from representatives of CDC, GAO, and from the only microbiologist 
called as witness in the hearing, but the agency faced challenges on several other fronts. While 
members of Congress that represented agricultural and pharmaceutical interests questioned the 
evidentiary basis of FDA’s proposed action, USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) 
published a briefing paper in September of 1977 that highlighted the substantial economic 
benefits of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in feed, which they acknowledged “must be weighed 
against the theoretical risks” of creating resistant bacteria.109 The ERS report based its evaluation 
on a total ban of all subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics, which was much more restrictive than the 
FDA proposals, but nevertheless concluded that FDA’s proposed action “could have a significant 
impact upon the efficiency of production of cattle, swine, and poultry.” FDA was being opposed 
not only by another federal agency that was involved in the regulation of food and agriculture, 
but also by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA), which at this point was 
																																																								




recommending the continued use of subtherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed.110 Nevertheless, 
during the hearing, Kennedy assured Representative Waxman and others that he had 
“communicated [his] own sense of urgency” about the current proposals to withdraw approval 
for certain subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines to FDA staff and the Office of 
General Counsel, and said that the issue was “receiving all the priority attention that I believe it 
can receive, stretching our resources as far as they will go.”111  
 Over the course of the next year, FDA continued to push forward with its proposals. In 
January of 1978, the agency published a third proposal to further restrict the sale of feed 
premixes containing penicillin and tetracyclines to FDA-approved feed manufacturers and to 
farmers only under the order of a veterinarian.112  During March and April of that year, FDA 
held three informal public hearings on the third proposal and ultimately decided to delay going 
forward with the distribution controls until the outcome of the first two proposals on animal feed 
antibiotics was known.113 The agency had also received numerous requests from drug sponsors 
for hearings on the proposals to ban subtherapeutic use of penicillin and restrict subtherapeutic 
use of tetracyclines, and planned to hold a formal evidentiary hearing as it continued to move 
forward in the rulemaking process.114 
 However, before FDA could take this step, Congress intervened to block FDA’s proposed 
actions. In September of 1978, Congress allocated $250,000 for a comprehensive study of the 
issue of antibiotics in animal feed to be carried out by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 
and prohibited FDA from moving forward on its current proposals, as well as from taking any 
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additional action to restrict antibiotic use in animals, until the NAS study could be completed.115 
Specifically, Congress asked the NAS to study the human health effects of the subtherapeutic use 
of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feeds, to review the existing epidemiological data, and to 
provide recommendations for future research.116 Congress requested that the NAS provide 
insight into the feasibility of additional epidemiological studies that could potentially begin to 
establish the direct link between human illness and the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics. 
This move struck a blow to FDA’s progress on this issue, indicating that Congress was 
sympathetic to the arguments from the animal production industries and pharmaceutical 
companies, which claimed that the existing evidence was not sufficient to justify FDA’s 
proposals. With little choice in the face of direct instruction from Congress, the agency 
announced in November of 1978 that it would delay the formal hearing on the current proposals 
until the completion of the NAS study, which was expected in March of 1980.117 
 
1978-1980: FDA, Industry, Congress, and the Battle Over Uncertainty 
 Over the next two years, Congress mandated that other agencies undertake studies of the 
issue to add to the body of evidence as they awaited the release of the NAS report. In late 1978, 
USDA released a report on the economic effects of the proposed and potential restrictions on 
animal antibiotic use that had been commissioned by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry. Unlike USDA’s prior economic impact study, this report undertook a 
more nuanced assessment of the effect of the proposed regulations, though it assumed that there 
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were no available substitutes and no changes in management practices. Though USDA seemed to 
maintain its position in the report that low-level use of antibiotics in animal feeds was beneficial 
for producers and consumers, the study found that “the economic system would generally be 
quite resilient to a more restrictive policy on animal drug use.”118 In July of the following year, 
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) published a report, also commissioned by the 
Senate Agriculture Committee, that looked at the benefits and risks of antibiotic use in animal 
agriculture, the availability of substitutes for each category of drugs, the acceptable risks in the 
use of each category, and the options available to Congress to improve the regulation of drugs 
used in animal feed.119 Based on the analysis of scientists and experts from the pharmaceutical 
and animal agriculture industries that consulted on this report, OTA concluded that there was “no 
real disagreement over the overall conclusion that food animals are the source of some infections 
in humans and that the use of antibacterials in feed is one cause of the growing pool of drug-
resistant pathogenic bacteria.”120 The report found that it would be exceptionally difficult to 
prove every step of the causal chain linking a case of human illness to the use of antibiotics in 
livestock feed, but that “each step in the chain has been documented repeatedly.”121 
 Both the USDA and OTA reports seemed to lend support to FDA’s position, and 
provided additional evidence that the economic impact of FDA’s proposals would not be as 
dramatic as opponents had warned, especially given that OTA concluded that most antibiotics 
could be replaced by alternative drugs that had already been approved by FDA. On March 18, 
1980, the National Research Council committee of the NAS released the results of their 
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congressionally mandated study on antibiotics in animal feed, which both FDA and Congress 
had hoped would provide definitive conclusions regarding the existing scientific knowledge on 
the issue. However, after a year of studying the matter, the committee reported that the existing 
data regarding the possible human health effects of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals were 
inconclusive and that “insurmountable technical difficulties” prevented a comprehensive 
epidemiological study from being realized or even suggested.122 In the report, the NAS stated 
that the potential link between antibiotics in feed and human health effects has been “neither 
proven nor disproven.”123 Although the authors emphasized in the following sentence that the 
lack of data “must not be equated with proof that the proposed hazards do not exist,” opponents 
of restrictions on antibiotic use in agriculture would quote those words for years to stymie FDA’s 
regulatory progress.124 
 In anticipation of the NAS report, Congress had marked $1.5 million in FDA’s budget for 
fiscal year 1980 to be used to carry out just the kind of “comprehensive” epidemiological study 
that the NAS had just deemed virtually impossible.125 Congress had hoped the NAS report would 
provide a research framework for such a study, but instead the report essentially suggested that 
the type of research policymakers seemed to need in order to take decisive action on 
subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics in animals would not be feasible.126 While the NAS report 
suggested that FDA and scientists could carry out studies that might strengthen the 
circumstantial evidence for a human health hazard or document various steps in the proposed 
																																																								









causal chain, it indicated that the direct link many were searching for might never been fully 
proven. 
 With FDA in no stronger a position to move forward with formal regulation of animal 
feed antibiotics than it had been before the NAS study, some in Congress moved to bolster the 
agency’s position. On May 7, 1980, Rep. John Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan, introduced 
the Antibiotics Preservation Act with his cosponsor, Rep. Henry Waxman, who had been vocal 
during the 1977 hearing on the need for FDA to move swiftly on its proposed restrictions.127 The 
Antibiotics Preservation Act proposed to amend Section 3(a)(1) of Section 507 of the FD&C Act 
to specifically require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to designate certain 
antibiotics that may not be used at subtherapeutic levels in animal feed within 180 days of the 
bill’s enactment.128 The FDA already had sufficient statutory authority to regulate such drugs if 
they were found to pose a hazard to human health. Nevertheless, Lester Crawford, the Director 
of the Bureau of Veterinary Medicine (BVM), said that the agency believed that “the bill’s 
proposed statutory mechanism for limiting the subtherapeutic animal feed uses of antibiotics 
[would] assist FDA in removing these products from the marketplace” by giving them a clear 
mandate and more flexibility in the regulatory process.129 
  In June of 1980, the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House 
Commerce Committee, of which Rep. Waxman was chairman, held a hearing on the bill. During 
the hearing, the USDA representative called to testify said that the scientific evidence linking 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals to the development of resistant strains of pathogenic 
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bacteria in humans remained “quite tentative.”130 He stressed that where there existed such 
uncertainty about a potential risk, costs and benefits of new actions should be weighed. This 
feeling was echoed by Rep. Tim Carter, the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, who cited 
the NAS study to demonstrate that the evidence on the “postulated hazards to human health” was 
“far from clear.”131 Rep. Charles Rose, a Democrat from North Carolina who chaired the House 
Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock and Grains and was considered a strong advocate for 
farmers, expressed the opposition to Dingell and Waxman’s bill shared by members from both 
parties who represented agricultural interests. Rep. Rose called the bill a “reaction to theoretical 
risks” that he considered hasty and unwise, and urged members of the subcommittee to proceed 
with greater caution when considering such a regulation.132 He reiterated the need to await more 
conclusive evidence before restricting “what has become a basic part of the meat industry’s 
effort to convert grain more efficiently into meat.”133  
Despite the suggested importance of this issue to the livestock industry, the National Pork 
Producers Council and the National Cattlemen’s Association declined to participate in the 
hearing.134 Some postulated that livestock producers did not like that the Commerce 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Health and Environment was holding the hearing because it 
framed an agricultural issue as a health issue. However, the National Pork Producers Council 
explained their absence in a letter to the subcommittee that stated that the issue had already been 
considered by the House and Senate agriculture committees, as well as the House Agriculture 
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Appropriations Subcommittee, all of whom had agreed with the livestock and pharmaceutical 
industries in opposing FDA’s proposals.135 The pork producers also suggested that the hearing 
would provide a “public platform for misguided activists to make unfounded charges” that would 
create “unfavorable publicity” for their products.136 Representatives of the Animal Health 
Institute, the industry organization that represented veterinary pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
provided testimony that called into question the certainty of the scientific evidence on the risk to 
human health created by the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in feed. In opposing Dingell’s bill, 
they buttressed the position of the livestock and pharmaceutical industries, as well as many 
members of Congress representing agricultural districts.137 
Conversely, Crawford’s testimony, representing the position of BVM and FDA as a 
whole, emphasized that the existing scientific evidence indicated a need for regulatory action. 
Crawford stated that “no one would disagree that continuous sub-therapeutic feeding of 
penicillin or tetracycline encourages the development of bacterial resistance,” or that resistant 
infections are difficult to cure in humans.138 Crawford dismissed the arguments of those who 
called for additional studies before moving forward with regulation, on the grounds that “what 
appears to be controversy is for the most part the contrivance of special interest groups.”139 He 
called the demand for more studies “the obvious gambit of the regulated industry,” which had 
effectively postponed reforms for over a decade, and compared the “so-called controversy” over 
whether to limit subtherapeutic antibiotic use in feed to the Bastian-Pasteur debates of the 
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continuing to ask for more studies even after the evidence was clear, Crawford argued that those 
who did not support the agency’s position at this point never would.140 Crawford also pointed to 
a number of other controversial proposals in the past, such as water purification and milk 
pasteurization, where the government moved forward on public health measures despite the fact 
that there could be “no human experimentation and there were no bodies in the streets,” and saw 
the material reduction of human maladies as a result.141  
During this 1980 hearing, FDA made its position clear: Congress should allow the agency 
to move forward with its proposals without further delay. However, FDA knew that there was 
interest in extending a “moratorium toward taking any final action” until the agency conducted 
the study that Congress had mandated in the 1980 appropriations bill.142 Crawford expressed 
FDA’s frustration regarding their orders from Congress, given that the NAS study had concluded 
that “the study envisioned by the Congress was not attainable.”143 Addressing a question from 
Rep. Waxman as to whether the agency believed regulatory action should be delayed until the 
completion of this study, Crawford said FDA was “in somewhat of a quandary because these 
studies would cost well over $1 million and yet would not finally answer the regulatory 
questions.”144 Based on the existing scientific evidence, the position of FDA and the 
administration was that subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed should 
be prohibited.145  
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 Nevertheless, FDA’s proposals were ultimately at the mercy of Congress, which faced a 
difficult issue involving complex science, unavoidable uncertainties, and strong vested interests 
that held power on both sides of the aisle. The true question at this critical point in the summer of 
1980 was not one of science, but one of policy. As Rep. Dingell expressed during his testimony, 
the issue at hand required policymakers to answer tough questions about the nature of proof and 
the appropriate course of action when the type of proof they desired was unattainable, and to 
decide for themselves when there existed sufficient data to justify action.146 While members of 
Congress remained split on these questions, the agency to which Congress had delegated the 
authority to make such judgments had made its position clear: the scientific community had 
provided its recommendations that the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed be limited, 
and the time for action had come. 
 Though FDA had found strong allies in Reps. Dingell and Waxman, the agency faced a 
formidable adversary in Rep. Jamie L. Whitten, a Democrat from Mississippi who served as the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.147 Whitten was known as a staunch advocate 
for farmers and was sometimes referred to as the “permanent secretary of agriculture.”148 It was 
Whitten who had led the charge to write a ban on FDA regulation of subtherapeutic animal 
antibiotic use in the appropriations bills for the previous two years.149 American Cyanamid 
Corporation, a leading manufacturer of penicillin and tetracyclines used in animals, had also 
been an active opponent of regulation, so much so that Crawford, the director of BVM, called the 
corporation “the biggest obstacle” to FDA’s regulatory efforts on this issue for more than eight 
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years.150 A veterinarian for American Cyanamid’s animal drug division described how the 
company had spent “plenty” attempting to delay, and ultimately prevent, the FDA proposals 
from being carried out, both by lobbying Congress to stop the agency and by sending 
information to livestock farmers in the hopes they would join the opposition.151  
Despite FDA’s efforts to persuade Congress to support their position in 1980, advocates 
for agricultural and pharmaceutical interests won the battle over subtherapeutic antibiotic use in 
animal feed in the short term. Whitten’s Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee prohibited 
FDA action on the issue again in the fiscal year 1981 appropriations bill, leaving the agency 
powerless to move forward with its proposals.152 The Appropriations Committee noted that there 
were “significant data gaps that must be filled before an informed agency decision is made,” and 
stated that “FDA will be expected to hold in abeyance any implementation of its proposal” 
pending the results of the epidemiological study Congress had asked FDA to complete.153 
Disappointed by Congress’s intervention, Crawford was quoted saying the ban defied “almost 
universal agreement” among microbiologists and public health experts that the subtherapeutic 
use of antibiotics in animal feed was “foolhardy,” and he noted that “the Appropriations 
Committee is a strange, strange body of experts,” to be making such a determination.154 FDA’s 
only hope of overcoming this prohibition lay with Dingell’s bill, which would have overridden 
the language in the appropriations committee’s report. Unfortunately for FDA, the Antibiotics 
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The battle over FDA’s proposals to restrict subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in feed from 
1977 to 1980 provides an extreme example of how negative external feedback can lead to 
diminished agency autonomy. The animal agriculture and pharmaceutical industries provided 
strong negative feedback both directly to the agency as well as to Congress, allowing them to 
exert influence though two channels. Congress, hoping that the NAS study would provide an 
unequivocal answer to the regulatory questions at hand, intervened directly to postpone FDA 
action until the results were published. When the results of the NAS study did not provide the 
answers they sought, and instead casted doubt on the idea that such questions could ever be 
answered to Congress’s satisfaction, FDA officials decided that the existing evidence was 
sufficient to justify moving forward with their proposals. Instead of deferring to agency decision-
making and the regulatory process designated for dealing with such issues, Congress stepped in 
once again to exert control directly over FDA’s behavior. Because FDA did not align its 
behavior with the feedback it received on its proposals to the satisfaction of external 
stakeholders, the agency’s autonomy was significantly reduced by direct intervention from 
Congress.  
Crawford, the director of BVM, expressed surprise and disappointment at the agency’s 
inability to regulate what he deemed to be a hazard to human health that fell directly under 
FDA’s statutory authority. While FDA’s ability to act swiftly on subtherapeutic antibiotics in 
feed had been fettered first by its burdensome rulemaking procedures and then by the prospect of 
legal action from the pharmaceutical industry (which is perhaps why FDA moved slowly after its 
initial task force report), Crawford seemed most surprised by Congress’s decision to place direct 




the passage of the 1981 agricultural appropriations bill that banned regulatory action on animal 
feed antibiotics, Crawford commented, “It’s the god-damnedest thing I’ve ever seen.”156 
 
1981-1985: New Scientific Evidence Renews the Debate 
 Though FDA was unable to proceed with its proposals to restrict subtherapeutic uses of 
penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed, the agency moved forward to carry out the 
epidemiological study for which Congress had allotted money in 1981. FDA contracted with the 
Seattle-King County Department of Health to carry out an epidemiological study of Salmonella 
and Campylobacter in meat products in the community and their link to human disease, hoping 
that the results would provide additional evidence to answer the lingering technical questions 
that were standing in the way of regulatory action.157 As this study was being completed, several 
other studies were published that made significant breakthroughs in the technical obstacles 
standing in the way of the proposals. The results of these studies weakened the argument that a 
direct link between subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals and human illness could not be 
proven, and strengthened FDA’s position significantly.  
In July of 1982, the New England Journal of Medicine published a study authored by 
Thomas O’Brien along with a number of prominent microbiologists and public health 
researchers that examined the transfer of antibiotic resistance among Salmonella bacteria.158 The 
study used a technique that extracted the genetic material that codes for resistance, called 
plasmids, from bacteria taken from animals and humans, and found that the plasmids were often 
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identical. This finding indicated that bacteria from animals and humans extensively share the 
genetic material that codes for resistance.159 Because the plasmids provided a unique 
“fingerprint” that they could identify, researchers were able to link a bacterium-plasmid 
combination that was found to be endemic in cattle in 20 states to an outbreak that infected 26 
persons caused by the same bacterium-plasmid combination, which showed characteristics of a 
foodborne infection.160 This study provided much-needed concrete evidence to support the 
theory that resistant bacteria in animals can be spread to humans. 
Two years later, Scott D. Holmberg of the CDC authored two key studies that further 
supported this link. In August of 1984, Holmberg and a team of CDC researchers reported that 
the majority of drug-resistant Salmonella outbreaks in the U.S. over the past decade were traced 
to animal food sources, and that patients with drug-resistant Salmonella infections had a 
significantly higher fatality rate that those infected with drug-responsive strains of the 
bacteria.161 A month later, Holmberg was the lead author of a study published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine that carefully investigated cases of antibiotic-resistant Salmonella 
newport infections among 18 people in the Midwest, and traced each case back to hamburger 
from a South Dakota beef cattle herd that had been fed subtherapeutic chlortetracycline for 
growth promotion.162 The authors concluded that the study “demonstrates that antimicrobial-
resistant organisms of animal origin cause serious human illness, and emphasizes the need for 
more prudent use of antimicrobials in both human beings and animals.”163 The findings of the S. 
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subtherapeutic antibiotic use in livestock and human illness that many had sought as a 
prerequisite to FDA regulation. Together with the CDC report on the Salmonella outbreak and 
the O’Brien study, Holmberg’s research gave those pushing for progress on FDA’s proposals 
renewed hope that Congress and the industry would allow the agency to move forward.164 
Lester Crawford, director of the renamed Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) at FDA, 
said that the S. newport study was “about as good as we’re going to get,” and that he “[didn’t] 
see how [FDA] can get any better information.”165 According to Crawford, the findings of these 
studies were consistent with CVM’s preliminary review of the Seattle-King epidemiological 
study that FDA had commissioned, but when Holmberg’s study was published in September of 
1984, the Seattle-King study was still under evaluation at the agency.166 Others who had studied 
the issue were also enthusiastic about the new evidence. Raoul Stallones, chairman of the 1980 
NAS study that had been unable to prove or disprove the existence of such a connection between 
human illness and subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals, said the Holmberg study was “as 
close as one can get to a direct link.” Stallone commented that had the Holmberg and O’Brien 
studies been available during NAS’s evaluation, the committee “might not have been as blasé 
about antibiotics” as they were.167 
Some opponents of FDA’s proposals denied that the recent studies were as significant as 
many were making them out to be, while others changed tacks and focused on alternative 
arguments to avoid regulation. Commenting on the S. newport study, a vice president at the 
Animal Health Institute, which represented animal drug manufacturers, said the authors had 
taken “a great leap in logic” to come to the conclusion that that the S. newport was of animal 
																																																								







origin and that there was “not a shred of evidence” to suggest that the bacteria could not have 
come from other foods.168 Many representing the views of livestock producers, including the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, acknowledged that the new studies had undermined their 
arguments that the scientific evidence was unable to show a direct link, and instead emphasized 
the economic costs to both farmers and consumers should FDA move forward with restrictions 
on subtherapeutic antibiotic use.169  
The Seattle-King study, which was the final report Congress had required FDA to 
complete before the agency was permitted to revisit its proposals, was released in November of 
1984, and addressed a much narrower, but critical, question that had hitherto been unanswered in 
the breakthrough studies of the early 1980s.170 The Seattle-King study was designed to help 
answer the question of how much human illness was caused by the consumption of bacteria from 
animal products, which was critical in helping policymakers understand the scope and magnitude 
of the risk and determine if restrictions were justified.171 The researchers found that of all the 
cases of diarrheal illness among residents of Seattle-King County, half were caused by the 
consumption of bacterially contaminated chicken. They also discovered that one in four chickens 
sold was contaminated by bacteria, primarily Salmonella and Campylobacter jejuni.172 
Additionally, the Seattle-King study determined that 30 percent of C. jejuni from animal and 
human sources were resistant to tetracycline, which at the time was fed to approximately 30 
percent of poultry in the U.S.173 
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Bolstered by significant new evidence that pointed to the human health hazards of 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals, FDA presented the new studies to Congress at a hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science 
and Technology in December of 1984. After having shelved the issue for several years, Crawford 
and his colleagues at CVM hoped they would now be able to proceed from a stronger position. 
However, Crawford acknowledged that they would have to handle the issue “gingerly” and 
“have the courage of [their] convictions” if they wanted to have any hope of pushing the 
proposals through, given the controversial nature of the topic and the negative feedback they had 
received from Congress and the industry during past attempts.174 Al Gore, then a Democratic 
representative from Tennessee serving as the chair of the subcommittee, cited the new scientific 
evidence on antibiotic resistance as the reason for the hearing, which was meant to provide 
members of Congress with the opportunity to evaluate whether the evidence supporting FDA’s 
proposals was more conclusive now than it was when Congress had voted to block them.175 
Researchers from the CDC as well as Dr. Thomas O’Brien, author of the breakthrough research 
on plasmids, were called as witness to discuss the new studies, as was Lester Crawford 
representing FDA and Dr. Donald Houston, the Administrator of the Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS) at USDA. During the hearing, Crawford expressed CVM’s view that Congress’s 
two major points of criticism regarding the agency’s 1977 proposals (that there was insufficient 
epidemiological evidence and there were no specific instances in which subtherapeutic antibiotic 
use in feed was linked with the subsequent development of human disease) were substantially 
addressed by the new studies. Crawford emphasized that now that the agency believed the 
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scientific gaps Congress had identified had been filled, they planned to decide on the issue in the 
near future.176  
Crawford also discussed the petition that the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
had received from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on November 20, 1984 to 
declare subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracycline in animal feed an imminent hazard to 
human health.177 The “imminent hazard” power of section 512(e)(1) of the FD&C Act gives the 
Secretary the authority to immediately suspend the approval of any animal drug use if it poses an 
imminent hazard to the health of man or of the animals on which the drug is being used, though 
the agency is still required to undergo the formal procedure to permanently withdraw the product 
after the Secretary has declared it an imminent hazard.178 Representatives from NRDC, called to 
testify in another panel during the hearing, said that the petition, signed by 300 leading scientists, 
represented not just NRDC’s position but “the concerns of the scientific community at large,” 
and was justified by NRDC’s morbidity estimates that subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal 
agriculture was linked to between 100 and 300 human deaths each year.179 Because formal 
withdrawal proceedings could take up to three years, the NRDC argued that the Secretary should 
immediately suspend approvals based on the evidence from recent scientific studies, since such 
action would pose no risk to human health and no significant risk to animal health.180  
Crawford said that the agency would hold a legislative-type hearing on the petition to 
gather and evaluate all available data and information, and then evaluate the petition based on the 
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criteria for designating an imminent hazard: (1) the likelihood that FDA would eventually 
withdraw approval; (2) the severity of harm pending withdrawal of approval; (3) the likelihood 
of harm pending withdrawal of approval; (4) the risk to treated animals from suspending 
marketing; and (5) other approaches to protect the public health.181 CVM would then provide a 
recommendation to the Secretary following this hearing, which was expected in the spring of 
1985.182 Crawford emphasized that FDA intended to decide both whether to move forward with 
withdrawal proceedings and whether to call for an immediate ban on penicillin and tetracycline 
use in feed in the near future. This move indicated that the agency wished to reestablish its 
autonomy in dealing with this issue and perhaps discourage further intervention by Congress.183 
During the 1984 hearing, Congress also impaneled Dr. Houston of FSIS to testify on 
behalf of USDA on the question of antibiotics in animal feed. Though USDA had never taken an 
official position on the issue, their reports had stressed the benefits of subtherapeutic antibiotic 
use in feed for livestock producers and American consumers. USDA representatives in previous 
Congressional hearings had emphasized the uncertainty of the scientific evidence linking the 
practice to human illness, putting USDA at odds with FDA’s position on its proposals. 
Interrupting Houston’s prepared statement describing USDA’s residue testing and meat 
inspection activities, the chairman of the subcommittee questioned Houston on USDA’s position 
on the proposed restrictions on antibiotics in animal feed, requesting USDA’s input on the 
questions they were discussing.184 Houston said that USDA had no position on the issue and 
declined to comment further on it, and while Rep. Gore said he believed USDA should be 
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involved due to its expertise, he understood “the political pressures that are brought to bear” on 
the USDA regarding these issues that might make USDA “reluctant to get involved.”185  
This exchange is significant because it highlights several key aspects of the tension 
between USDA and FDA on the issue of antibiotics in animal feed that often lies below the 
surface of the debate. Though FDA and USDA are both charged with overseeing various aspects 
of food production that are often closely intertwined, their underlying mandates differ in ways 
that can cause conflict. Because FDA is charged with protecting human and animal health while 
USDA works on behalf of American agriculture, the issue of antibiotic use in animal feed is 
viewed through fundamentally different lenses by the two departments. Though tasked with 
working together on the regulation of animal agriculture and food production, FDA’s proposed 
regulations were largely opposed by farmers, placing USDA in a difficult position. While USDA 
did not actively involve itself in lobbying for or against FDA’s proposals, its veiled critique of 
FDA’s position during Congressional hearings and in its reports placed additional pressure on 
FDA that may have factored into FDA’s behavior on the issue. 
Though USDA refrained from commenting on FDA’s proposals, representatives from the 
National Cattlemen’s Association, the National Pork Producers Council, and the National Feed 
Manufacturers Association called to testify during the hearing expressed concern about FDA’s 
proposals, criticizing the agency’s evaluation of the science and emphasizing the economic costs 
of restrictions on the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics.186 Though they had declined to participate 
in the last Congressional hearing on the issue in 1980 because they felt the issue had already 
been adequately considered, the cattlemen and pork producers both sent the chairs of their 
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respective antibiotic task forces to urge Congress to block FDA. Their presence at the hearing 
suggests that they perceived the issue as a serious threat to their industry’s practices. 
During the following year, when FDA had planned to hold hearings on the 1977 
proposals, the CVM came under increased Congressional scrutiny for its regulation of animal 
drugs. In July of 1985, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations held 
a hearing on FDA’s regulation of animal drugs in which members called on CVM officials to 
explain why so many animal drugs currently on the market had not been adequately vetted or 
approved by the agency.187 In December of that year, the subcommittee issued a report that 
provided the most in-depth evaluation of FDA’s ability to oversee the animal drug industry in 15 
years.188 The report criticized FDA for failing to adequately regulate animal drugs, highlighting a 
number of cases in which the agency did not remove dangerous drugs from the market or prevent 
the illegal marketing or unapproved use of certain substances. However, the subcommittee 
focused mostly on carcinogenic substances and illegal sales of animal drugs, and did not mention 
the agency’s regulation of subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics. 
Perhaps this elevated level of scrutiny of CVM’s regulatory behavior by Congress was 
one reason why the agency appeared to move the issue of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal 
feed to the back burner over the next several years. The report alarmed some already concerned 
about antibiotic use in animal agriculture, who believed that Congress and the agency should feel 
greater urgency now that FDA’s ability to oversee the animal drug industry had been called into 
question.189 However, with Congress forcing FDA’s attention to the major cases identified in its 
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somewhat scathing report on CVM’s performance, the agency may have determined that to focus 
on addressing the problems Congress identified was a better use of their resources than 
attempting to work against Congressional will to push through its 1977 proposals. Because both 
the budgetary and political costs of proceeding with the formal withdrawal process were high 
and unlikely to be outweighed by the political benefits, FDA’s decision not to act on its 
proposals at this time was a rational response to the external signals it was receiving. After 
holding hearings on NRDC’s petition for the agency to declare subtherapeutic use of penicillin 
and tetracyclines in animal feed to be an imminent hazard, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services rejected the group’s petition.190 This marked the beginning of the period of several 
years in which the issue languished at FDA. 
 
 1985-1999: FDA Moves Towards an Informal Regulatory Strategy 
 During the decade following FDA’s rejection of NRDC’s imminent hazard petition, the 
agency was virtually silent on the issue of subtherapeutic antibiotics in feed. Nevertheless, other 
organizations continued to examine the link between the practice and the emergence of more 
antibiotic-resistant illnesses in humans, creating a growing body of evidence pointing to the need 
for regulatory action. In 1986, shortly after Congress had issued its report criticizing FDA for its 
inadequate regulation of animal drugs, the CDC published a report that made this link even 
clearer. The report found that food animals were a major source of antibiotic-resistant strains of 
salmonella, particularly those resistant to penicillin and tetracycline, and concluded that “these 
infections [were] associated with antimicrobial use on farms.”191 The principal author of the new 
study said that it called into question the practice of using human antibiotics in animals; at the 
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same time, both the cattlemen’s and veterinarians’ associations reportedly stated that “the routine 
use of antibiotics in animal feed is now discouraged.”192 FDA did not comment extensively on 
the CDC report when it was released, but a representative said the agency was in the process of 
reviewing all new information and that they planned to decide by the end of the year whether to 
attempt a ban again or take a different position.193  
 In 1987, Commissioner Frank Young of FDA requested that NAS’s Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) carry out a study on the issue once again, this time focusing specifically on predictive risk 
evaluation.194 In late 1988, IOM released its results, which prompted Gerald Guest, the Director 
of CVM at the time, to create a working group for evaluating the issues raised by the new 
study.195 Headed by Gary Dykstra of CVM, the working group did not conclude its review until 
July of 1990, at which point the CVM said it hoped to decide on the issue by the end of that 
summer.196 Expressing irritation at the slow pace of progress on the issue, Dykstra said, “It’s 
very frustrating. Every time we try to do something definitive, Congress pokes its head in.”197 
 Congress had not directly interfered since 1984, when FDA had completed the Seattle-
King study, but the agency had not made any moves to act on its proposals to withdraw 
approvals for feed antibiotics. Though CVM continued to evaluate new evidence on antibiotic 
resistance, they had ostensibly abandoned any plans to continue through the formal rulemaking 
process. Instead, the agency set out on a different course that would attract less resistance from 
industry and Congress. 
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 In August of 1995, FDA announced that it had approved a new antibiotic for chicken in 
order to prevent outbreaks of E. coli in poultry facilities.198 Sarafloxacin, the new drug, was the 
first to fall under FDA’s new monitoring program with the CDC and USDA, which required that 
the agencies test Salmonella and E. coli samples in humans and animals in search of evidence 
that resistance to the drug might be increasing.199 The announcement of the National 
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) was the first active step beyond 
requesting and reviewing new studies that FDA had taken since the 1977 proposals had been 
thwarted. This change of approach indicated that perhaps the agency was looking for a new path 
forward for regulating subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal feed. 
 Shortly thereafter, FDA put its position on the practice into writing. In November of 
1998, the agency published a draft of Guidance for Industry (GFI) 78, entitled, “Evaluation of 
Human Health Impact of the Microbial Effects of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs Intended for 
Use in Food-Producing Animals.”200 The guidance document, which did not bind the agency or 
the regulated entities, reflected FDA’s current thinking on the issue of subtherapeutic antibiotic 
use in animal agriculture, stating that FDA “now believe[d] it [was] necessary to evaluate the 
human health impact of the microbial effects” associated with all antimicrobial new animal drugs 
to be used in food-producing animals.201 The draft stated that based on scientific evidence, the 
agency now believed sponsors of all antimicrobial new animal drugs that were intended for use 
in food-producing animals “should provide information relating to resistance and pathogen load 
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to allow FDA to determine if the products are safe” under the FD&C Act.202 Although this would 
only apply to new animal drug applications, the draft guidance signaled that FDA had not 
abandoned its attempts to regulate antibiotic use in animal agriculture, but had decided on 
different tactics. 
 A few months later, FDA published a framework document in the Federal Register that 
represented the second step in the agency’s consideration of issues related to antimicrobial new 
animal drugs in food-producing animals.203 The document set out a conceptual risk-based 
framework that would serve as an official guide for FDA in evaluating the human safety of the 
use of new antibiotics in food-producing animals during the new drug approval process. Though 
it is unclear what motivated FDA to take these two steps after several years of inaction, they 
followed the publication of a widely-read study in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1998 
that identified the emergence of a “superstrain” of Salmonella bacteria found in food that was 
resistant to most drugs.204 
 In June of 1999, FDA created the Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance 
with CDC and NIH in order to coordinate efforts to manage antibiotic resistance across the 
federal government.205 The task force, which was later joined by several other agencies, created a 
“Public Health Action Plan to Combat Antibiotic Resistance” that was published two years later 
and specified a variety of steps to be taken by the three agencies.206 Though the task force 
created extensive recommendations related to preventing overuse and misuse of antibiotics in 
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human medicine, it included few recommendations for new efforts in the realm of animal 
agriculture. 
These actions represent a marked departure from the agency’s original attempts to 
regulate subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in feed, which had indicated that FDA felt it held a 
strong position from which to initiate formal withdrawal proceedings that tend to be both 
politically and financially costly for the agency. The new actions were comparatively weak, as 
they bound neither the agency nor the drug sponsors and only applied to new animal drug 
applications. The framework document essentially created a suggested path forward for those 
applying for new drug applications without evaluating those already on the market. This move 
on the part of FDA to substitute a weaker, informal regulatory action for formal rulemaking 
reveals FDA’s assessment that its political position had been compromised, and that the 
substantial expenditure of budgetary and political resources needed to move forward with 
rulemaking would be better used in other areas. 
 Though FDA appeared to have given up on taking tougher action on subtherapeutic 
antibiotic use in animals, proponents of the ban had not. In March of 1999, only a few months 
after FDA had published its draft guidance and framework document, the Environmental 
Defense Fund and the Center for Science in the Public Interest, along with 39 other groups, 
petitioned FDA for the second time to ban the use of antibiotics in animal feed if the same class 
of drugs were used in human medicine.207 The petition named seven antibiotics that were used in 
both humans and animals at the time, including penicillin and tetracyclines, and was similar to a 
ban that the European Union had put in place in 1998 after the occurrence of mad cow disease in 
																																																								




the UK.208 The petition also mirrored the recommendations of the WHO, which had met consider 
the issue in 1997 and 1998, and had advised that no antibiotics used in human medicine be used 
for growth promotion in animals.209 FDA was required to respond to the petition within 180 
days, but at the time FDA received it, Stephen Sundlof, the director of CVM, said he “doubt[ed] 
that the agency ha[d] the authority to impose a broad ban on the use of antibiotics in animal 
feed.”210 Even proponents of the petition seemed to agree with Sundlof that Congress was highly 
unlikely to approve the type of widespread ban that petitioners were pushing, citing the strong 
influence of pharmaceutical companies, which already objected to FDA’s milder plans to 
monitor and evaluate the influence of new antimicrobial drugs on resistance set forth earlier that 
year.211 
 Though Sundlof did not believe FDA had the authority to enact a ban, he did move 
forward with the agency’s guidance document, publishing the final version of GFI 78 on 
December 17, 1999.212 The guidance maintained most of its original content, but FDA noted that 
in response to public comments on the draft guidance and the framework document, the agency 
had altered some language to “indicate that additional testing would not always be needed to 
determine the potential human health impact of the microbial effects associated with 
antimicrobial new animal drugs” for use in food-producing animals.213 FDA’s use of softer 
language in the final draft was likely aimed at appeasing pharmaceutical companies by assuring 
them that the guidance would not place a heavy burden on animal drug sponsors. Though GFI 78 
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did formally establish for the first time that FDA believed it was necessary to consider the human 
health impact of the microbial effects of all uses of all antimicrobial new animal drugs during the 
approval process, its status as a nonbinding guidance document and its applicability only to new 
animal drug applications made it a relatively weak regulatory step. This guidance document was 
also the first major indication that FDA was shifting strategies, increasing their focus on finding 
common ground with industry, rather than attempting formal rulemaking against a tide of 
opposition from pharmaceutical companies and livestock producers, both aimed directly at the 
agency and channeled through Congress. 
 
The Early 2000s: Fluoroquinolone Use in Animals Raises Concerns 
 At the turn of the 21st century, FDA appeared to be reorienting its approach on 
subtherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed by aiming to build industry support for new regulatory 
steps, which had generally meant substituting weaker, informal actions for formal rulemaking. 
At the same time, the animal pharmaceutical industry was undergoing changes in the feed 
antibiotics market, as Europe began moving towards a full ban of most in-feed uses of antibiotics 
in animal agriculture.214 By early 2000, industry leaders were predicting that Europe would ban 
all antibiotics used in animal feed by the end of 2001, and Denmark, Sweden, and Finland had 
already abolished the use of antibiotics for growth promotion.215 In the previous two years, both 
the WHO and CDC had called for an end to growth promotion uses for several antibiotics in 
livestock. Even an undersecretary at USDA, which tended to side with agricultural interests over 
FDA, said in 2000 that the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals contributed to the 
																																																								
214 Feliza Mirasol, “Ban on Animal Feed Antibiotics Opens Door to New Alternatives,” Chemical Market Reporter 
257.11 (2000): 14. 





problem of antibiotic resistance, and that “the agricultural community must accept part of the 
responsibility.”216 The animal pharmaceutical industry was taking notice of these changes, and 
began to face the possibility that severe restrictions might be placed on these drugs not only in 
Europe, but perhaps eventually in the U.S., as well. In March of 2000, two major pharmaceutical 
companies were reportedly working to bring the first alternative feed supplements for growth 
promotion to market, chiefly due to the imminent closing of the in-feed antibiotic market in 
Europe.217  
Later that year, the pharmaceutical industry saw what the impact of such a ban would 
look like up close. In October of 2000, the financial fallout from a 1998 EU ban on Stafac, the 
company’s in-feed virginiamycin drug, forced pharmaceutical giant Pfizer to sell its animal feed 
drug business after total sales declined by approximately 60 percent from 1997 to 1999.218 In 
2000, Stephen Sundlof, Director of CVM, said that there were few companies coming to FDA 
with new low-dose antibiotic uses anymore, which he attributed to the industry’s realization that 
“the regulatory hurdles [were] going to be higher.”219 Though the animal pharmaceutical 
industry seemed to be preparing for the worst, these changes did not necessarily indicate they 
would be any less vehement in their opposition to FDA regulation. 
 By 2000, a new concern had come to FDA’s attention that prompted the agency to 
reconsider the use of formal rulemaking. In 1986, FDA had approved the first drug for humans in 
a new class of antibiotics called fluoroquinolones, which were able to replace some of the older 
antibiotics that were no longer as effective due to widespread resistance.220 In 1995, FDA also 
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gave approval for the use of one fluoroquinolone, sarafloxacin, in the drinking water of chickens 
to prevent E. coli outbreaks because other antibiotics were not working. Sarafloxacin was the 
first drug to fall under NARMS, FDA’s new resistance monitoring program with USDA and 
CDC.221 FDA approval for animal use of a fluoroquinolone was intensely opposed by CDC, 
which cited concern about resistance due to the importance of fluoroquinolones in human 
medicine.222 In the end, CDC’s concerns were realized, when a 1999 study by CDC and 
Minnesota public health researchers published in the New England Journal of Medicine found a 
significant increase in fluoroquinolone-resistant Campylobacter jejuni infections in humans from 
1992 to 1998, rising from 1.2 percent of the observed cases to 10.2 percent over the course of six 
years.223 By analyzing resistant C. jejuni from retail chicken products and comparing them with 
domestically acquired C. jejuni infections in Minnesota residents, researchers were able to 
determine that the increase in the fluoroquinolone-resistant infections in humans was almost 
certainty attributable to the use of the drug at subtherapeutic levels in chickens.224  
 At the time that this new evidence of fluoroquinolone resistance was becoming available, 
the GAO released a report requested by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry regarding the human health implications of agricultural uses of antibiotics.225 The report 
noted that FDA and USDA held different views on whether the available scientific evidence 
warranted additional regulation or restriction of antibiotic use in animal agriculture, but 
recommended that FDA and USDA work together to create and implement a plan with specific 
goals, resources and timeframes to ensure the safe use of antibiotics in agriculture. Together with 
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the emerging concern about fluoroquinolone resistance, the GAO report provided advocates of 
greater restrictions on agricultural antibiotic use with hope that FDA would have renewed 
momentum. 
 Meanwhile, FDA was continuing its effort to gradually build consensus between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the public health community around less controversial measures. In 
January of 1999, FDA held a public meeting to receive comments on the framework document it 
had published the previous year. Less than a year before the New England Journal of Medicine 
study was published raising the alarm about fluoroquinolones (and just one month after FDA 
officials had told GAO researchers that they were concerned about fluoroquinolone resistance), 
FDA approved fluoroquinolones for use in beef cattle.226 Though FDA’s actions in 1998 and 
1999 suggested that the agency did not believe it had sufficient external support for strong action 
on antibiotics in feed, its position had changed by late 2000.  
 On October 31, 2000, FDA published its proposed rule withdrawing approval for 
fluoroquinolone use in poultry.227 If the FDA succeeded, the ban would be a major landmark in 
the agency’s regulation of subtherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed, as it would be the first drug 
approval ever withdrawn due to concerns about the emergence of resistance and its impact on 
human health. Abbott Laboratories, one of the two companies that manufactured the drug, agreed 
to stop making the drug and voluntarily withdraw its product from the market, but Bayer, the 
drug’s major manufacturer, decided to challenge the ban.228 Though FDA devoted considerable 
legal resources to the challenge, the procedural difficulties of withdrawing an existing approval 
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and Bayer’s commitment to contesting FDA’s proposal meant that to enact a ban on the drug use 
was not a forgone conclusion.229  
 FDA’s decision to pursue formal action withdrawing fluoroquinolones from the animal 
pharmaceutical market marked a departure from its strategy of the previous several years. 
Though it was able to persuade one of the drug’s two manufacturers to voluntarily comply with 
its proposal, the agency knew Bayer would challenge the withdrawal before it decided to take 
action. However, deviating from its pursuit of informal actions that were supported by industry, 
FDA chose to move forward with a formal withdrawal despite opposition from a major 
pharmaceutical corporation. FDA’s decision to break from its previous strategy and undertake a 
procedurally and financially intensive regulatory action despite Bayer’s opposition indicates that 
the agency believed its position on fluoroquinolones was strong, backed by external signals from 
those who favored the ban that outweighed Bayer’s opposition.  
In examining the factors FDA was weighing when it decided to propose withdrawal in 
late 2000, it is clear that the scientific context likely played a significant role in enabling FDA’s 
regulation. CDC made a critical contribution by carrying out a key study on fluoroquinolone 
resistance, which made it difficult for those opposed to FDA restrictions on animal antibiotic use 
to deny the connection between the drug’s use in poultry and the increased incidence of resistant 
infections in humans. The 1999 GAO report that urged FDA to work with other agencies to 
develop and implement a concrete plan for protecting human health against the hazard of 
growing antibiotic resistance likely signaled to the agency that they might have political support 
for action if they had a legitimate case based on human health concerns. In addition to the CDC 
study and the GAO report, FDA’s success in persuading one of the two manufacturers to agree to 
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voluntarily comply allowed them to avoid some of the backlash from industry, which might have 
otherwise changed FDA’s calculus. According to a 2004 GAO report, FDA also decided to 
proceed with withdrawal efforts because the agency knew there were effective alternatives for 
treatment of this illness in poultry, which may explain why poultry producers did not provide 
more opposition.230  
Though it is unclear to what extent each of these factors played a role in shaping FDA’s 
decision to take action despite Bayer’s opposition, revisiting the circumstances of the agency’s 
last decision to engage in formal rulemaking on the issue in 1977 provides useful context. In a 
1977 Congressional hearing on the FDA’s proposed withdrawal of penicillin and tetracycline, 
Donald Kennedy, former Commissioner of FDA, said that when considering a resource-intensive 
action, one of the most important questions FDA officials consider is whether the evidence is 
strong enough for the proposed action to stand up to challenges.231 Otherwise, to pursue such an 
action would be a waste of the agency’s limited resources, Kennedy said. Even though FDA’s 
1977 attempts indicate that strong scientific evidence alone is not always enough to ensure an 
action will be successful, CDC’s role in providing the scientific context combined with external 
signals likely persuaded FDA that to attempt to withdraw approval for fluoroquinolones at that 
time would be a fruitful use of agency resources. 
 Ultimately, FDA’s decision to pursue a formal withdrawal proved successful. FDA held 
an evidentiary hearing at the request of Bayer and the Animal Health Institute, and in March of 
2004, an FDA Administrative Law Judge issued its initial decision approving the withdrawal on 
the grounds that fluoroquinolone use in poultry had not been shown to be safe. Bayer then filed 
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an exception to the initial decision, delaying the final ruling an additional year. Despite Bayer’s 
sustained efforts to block the action and the lengthy procedure required of the agency, FDA 
issued its final decision to withdraw approval for fluoroquinolone use in poultry in August of 
2005.232 FDA’s first successful attempt to ban an approved antibiotic drug use in animals due to 
concerns about resistance took five years of sustained effort, indicating that formal withdrawal 
proceedings might not be a feasible option for FDA’s regulation of broad classes of antibiotic 
uses going forward. 
 
FDA Pushes for a More Proactive Strategy 
 While FDA was working to advance its fluoroquinolone withdrawal, the agency was also 
continuing its efforts to strengthen scrutiny of antibiotics during the new animal drug approval 
process. In late December of 2000, FDA published a document proposing two thresholds that 
would be used in the regulation of antibiotics in food-producing animals in order to limit the 
emergence and spread of resistance.233 The draft document was intended to build on the 
framework document that FDA had published in 1999, which discussed approaches to 
monitoring antibiotic use in animals and the development of resistance, both before and after 
approval. The new draft also built on the framework document’s recommendation for integrating 
consideration of the human health impact of resistance into the approval and evaluation 
processes for animal antibiotic drug uses. The new document proposed two monitoring 
thresholds that were centered on the standard of “reasonable certainty of no harm” to humans for 
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any use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, and which would trigger both voluntary and 
mandatory regulatory steps. A human health threshold would be based on the prevalence of 
resistant infections in humans when the resistance was attributable the use of the antibiotic in 
animals. The threshold represented “the level at which there is no longer a reasonable certainty 
of no harm to human health associated with antimicrobial resistance development as a 
consequence of antimicrobial drug use in food-producing animals.”234 There would also be a 
resistance-in-animals threshold that represented the maximum acceptable level of resistance in 
food-producing animals, based on a risk-assessment model that linked resistance in animals to 
the human health risk. While certain voluntary steps would be triggered if FDA monitoring 
revealed decreased drug efficacy or increased resistance, if either threshold was exceeded, the 
agency would be required to initiate a withdrawal of the drug. 
 The threshold document was a discussion paper meant to reflect FDA’s current thinking 
on one way to develop resistance thresholds, and thus was an informal and relatively weak 
regulatory action because it did not bind the agency. However, FDA used the document to test 
the waters on two significant concepts that, if implemented, would result in a substantially 
stronger regulatory approach to antibiotic use in food-producing animals. FDA’s choice of the 
“reasonable certainty of no harm” standard for regulating animal antibiotic use represented a 
much stronger protection for human health than an approach that balanced risks and benefits, 
which had characterized discussion of the issue since FDA’s first attempted regulations in the 
late 1970s. Health and consumer groups applauded FDA for selecting this standard, as they 
considered the decision not to allow the weighing of economic risks and benefits to be a 
significant positive development in protecting human health.235 The pharmaceutical industry, 
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however, intensely opposed the proposed standard in a public meeting in late January of 2001, 
threatening to sue FDA if it decided to use a “reasonable certainty of no harm” standard in its 
regulation of the drugs.236 The draft document also took a significant step by putting forward a 
proactive plan that triggered formal regulatory steps, signaling that FDA would pursue more 
aggressive regulation going forward. 
 Continuing with this strategy, FDA published a draft guidance in September of 2002 that 
was intended to assist in the implementation of the framework and threshold documents that the 
agency had published in the previous three years.237 The draft guidance (GFI 152) provided drug 
sponsors with a recommended approach for conducting a qualitative risk assessment to evaluate 
antibiotic resistance concerns. This risk assessment was to be submitted to FDA as part of the 
preapproval safety appraisal. For months after the draft guidance was published, agricultural and 
pharmaceutical companies vigorously debated FDA and public health officials on the nature of 
the risk and the parameters of the risk assessment that should be conducted during FDA’s public 
hearings on the guidance.238 While concern about FDA’s mismanagement of the 
fluoroquinolones issue spurred many advocates of tougher action on antibiotics in animals to 
support the creation of an established framework for risk assessment, the pharmaceutical 
industry was lobbying for language that would make it difficult for FDA to deny approval for a 
new drug.239 One year later, FDA published the final version of GFI 152, which provided steps 
for characterizing the hazard to human health presented by the drug use as high, medium, or low 
risk based on the drug’s importance in human medicine and an assessment of the release, 
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exposure, and consequences of the drug use.240 Though nonbinding, the guidance laid out 
another concrete step for implementing the ideas proposed in FDA’s framework document and 
formalizing the consideration of resistance concerns in the human health evaluation of antibiotic 
new animal drugs. 
 Though both were informal actions, the threshold document and GFI 152 gave the 
impression that FDA was looking to move towards a more aggressive strategy for regulating 
antibiotic use in animals. Nevertheless, many advocates for a tougher regulatory stance were 
skeptical that these steps would lead to real action. A GAO report published in 2004 that had 
been jointly commissioned by three Senate committees echoed many of these concerns.241 
Though the report noted that FDA had begun using the framework from its guidance to evaluate 
new animal drug applications and to review existing approvals for animal antibiotics, it found 
that FDA had not prioritized for review the antibiotics that the agency itself had identified as 
“critically important to human health.” As of April of 2004, over two years after FDA had 
finalized its threshold document, not one of the drugs FDA had identified as critically important 
to human health in its 2002 guidance had been reviewed using the framework, and the reviews 
the agency had conducted had taken at least two years to complete.242 This meant that it would 
likely take many years, and perhaps several decades, for FDA to complete its review of 
medically important antibiotics. If the agency decided regulatory action on a drug was required, 
administrative proceedings could extend for several additional years before regulation could take 
effect.  
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Furthermore, the GAO report expressed concern that the framework set out in GFI 152 
might not be effective in preventing the spread of resistance, given that FDA had reviewed seven 
new animal drug applications under the new framework by spring of 2004 and had never denied 
a new or supplemental animal drug application due to evidence that the drug caused antibiotic 
resistance in humans.243 Under the guidance, even those drugs categorized as high risk could still 
be approved with certain restrictions if there was “reasonable certainty of no harm.” Though 
such a standard was thought to be more protective than a balancing of risks and benefits, it was 
unclear how much proof of harm would be needed in practice to justify denying a new drug 
application. 
 The first risk assessments the agency carried out under the new guidance were for 
subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines. These drugs had been the subject of FDA’s 
1977 proposals and included in the 1984 and 1999 withdrawal petitions to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services from NRDC and several other health and public interest groups. 
According to documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, after completing a two-
year-long review, FDA sent letters to four producers of approved animal feed additives 
containing penicillin and tetracyclines stating that the administrative record did not contain 
sufficient information to alleviate safety concerns, and invited them to meet with CVM to 
discuss the findings of their review.244 A year later, FDA had still taken no action on these 
antibiotics. The Environmental Defense Fund, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
American Public Health Association, Food Animal Concerns Trust, and Union of Concerned 
Scientists then filed a petition requesting that FDA withdraw approvals for herdwide/flockwide 
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uses of seven antibiotics, including penicillin and tetracyclines, for growth promotion and 
disease prevention and control uses. In doing so, health and public interest groups put pressure 
on FDA to take formal regulatory action to curtail subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals. 
 By the end of 2005, FDA was under fire from members of Congress, scientists, public 
health officials, and health and public interest groups for its new strategy, which was criticized as 
weak, ineffective, and without a reasonable timeline. In August of 2005, the Preservation of 
Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act (PAMTA) was introduced into the House and the Senate 
for the third time, which would order FDA to review the safety of approved growth-promotion 
antibiotics that were important to human medicine and collect data on their use, going further 
than FDA’s risk assessment plans at the time.245 More than 380 organizations endorsed PAMTA, 
and the WHO, IOM, and NAS had recommended severe restriction or a full ban of growth 
promotion uses of antibiotics, advocating for action that was more aggressive than FDA’s 
strategy at this time.246 In addition to the 2004 GAO report urging FDA to expedite its risk 
assessments and the 2005 petition from environmental, health, and consumer groups, support for 
more decisive action by Congress and the scientific community indicated that many important 
FDA influencers did not support a weak, informal strategy on this issue. 
Weighed against this negative feedback was the positive feedback from industry, which 
tended to be more receptive of FDA’s informal regulatory approach than its attempts to address 
the issue through formal rulemaking. The need for industry support proved more important to 
FDA than the negative political feedback it received for not taking a more hardline approach to 
the issue, likely due to the agency’s constrained resources. As FDA was implementing this 
																																																								
245 Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2562, 109th Congress (2005); Preservation 
of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2005, S. 742, 109th Congress (2005). 
246 Rebecca Clouse, “Nursing Organizations Call for Phase-Out of Agricultural Practices That Promote Antibiotic 




strategy, it was also going through the withdrawal process for fluoroquinolones. This experience 
was teaching FDA that engaging in formal regulatory procedures to withdraw approval for a 
drug without the cooperation of the drug’s sponsor could be time-consuming and costly, even 
when Congress, the scientific community, and the public largely supported the action. Perhaps 
based on this experience, FDA determined it would not be feasible for them to work against 
industry in most cases. In explaining the agency’s current strategy to GAO, FDA officials 
emphasized that by obtaining voluntary cooperation from a drug sponsor in implementing risk 
management strategies, FDA might be able to avoid “lengthy administrative proceedings” that 
are costly for the agency.247  
 
Cephalosporins Put FDA’s New Guidance to the Test 
 The efficacy of FDA’s new guidance in protecting the public health was soon put to the 
test, as the agency considered a drug application that would allow a new class of medically 
important antibiotics to be used in animal agriculture. In the fall of 2006, FDA convened its 
Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee (VMAC) to assess the safety of a new antibiotic drug 
application for cefquinome, a fourth-generation cephalosporin that was the first in its class to be 
developed for agriculture, intended for use in cattle to treat bovine respiratory disease.248 
Because of the importance of cephalosporins in human medicine, the potential for cross-
resistance, and the availability of more than a dozen other medicines already available and 
effective for treating bovine respiratory disease, VMAC voted to reject the application.249 
However, FDA was not bound to follow the committee’s recommendation, and Steven Sundlof, 
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the director of CVM at the time, emphasized that the application would ultimately be judged 
under the parameters set out in GFI 152.250 Both Intervet, the drug’s sponsor, and FDA found 
that under GFI 152, cefquinome could be classified as a medium risk. While some of those who 
voted against approval disputed that classification, most felt that the guidance simply did not 
adequately assess the real risk to human health posed by the drug.251  
 By spring of 2007, FDA was reported to be on track to approve cefquinome, drawing 
significant backlash from health and public interest groups.252 In January of 2007, Rep. Louise 
Slaughter, who sponsored PAMTA, wrote a letter to FDA urging it not to approve the drug. 
Several other organizations, including the American Medical Association, the Keep Antibiotics 
Working coalition, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, had communicated their opposition 
to FDA, as well.253 The criticism of FDA’s handling of the cephalosporin case shed light on 
several failings of GFI 152, most notably its narrow consideration of applicable human health 
risks. The major reason cefquinome could be approved under GFI 152 despite its importance in 
human medicine was that although fourth-generation cephalosporins were the only drugs able to 
treat serious infection in cancer patients, and were ranked by WHO as critically important to 
human health, they were not used as frontline treatments for foodborne illnesses.254 In classifying 
drugs according to their use in human medicine, GFI 152 heavily prioritized those drugs used in 
treating foodborne illnesses, while “other bacteria [could] be considered when necessary.”255 
Many pointed out that this bias made it exceedingly difficult to deny a new drug application on 
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the grounds of its importance in human medicine if the drug was not used to treat foodborne 
illnesses, even if it was critical to therapy for other diseases. 
 Another key weakness of GFI 152 that was highlighted in the cefquinome case was what 
many considered an inadequate weighing of concerns about cross-resistance. Many scientists at 
the VMAC meeting noted the potential for fourth-generation cephalosporins to select for traits 
that would confer resistance not only to its own class, but also to third-generation 
cephalosporins, which were widely used to treat pneumonia, meningitis, and serious 
gastrointestinal infections. Because the classification of a cephalosporin into a given 
“generation” is unrelated to the drug’s chemical structure, and because cephalosporins are broad-
spectrum antibiotics that use the same mechanism of action as other beta-lactam antibiotics, 
many felt that FDA’s assessment should have weighed more heavily the potential for cross-
resistance, both to other cephalosporins and to beta-lactams like penicillin. The cefquinome case 
tested the efficacy of the agency’s new guidance on a drug that was known to be critical in 
human medicine and highly likely to confer cross-resistance. In doing so, this case revealed the 
weaknesses of the guidance’s qualitative assessment of the consequence of a lost treatment 
option in humans when evaluating new antimicrobial drugs. 
 Though FDA had still neither approved nor denied the cefquinome application by 
December of 2009, concern about off-label uses of cephalosporins arose during the public debate 
of the new drug. During the 2006 VMAC meeting, the CDC, along with the Infectious Diseases 
Society of America, the American Medical Association, the Keep Antibiotics Working coalition, 
and the Union of Concerned Scientists, advocated strongly for a prohibition on extra-label use of 
cefquinome, should it be approved for therapy. Third-generation cephalosporins were already 




the Animal Medicinal Drug User Clarification Act (AMDUCA) in 1994.256 AMDUCA allowed 
veterinarians to prescribe extra-label uses of any approved animal and human drugs unless 
specifically prohibited by FDA. In order to prohibit extra-label use, FDA must find that extra-
label use presents a risk to the public health and go through a formal regulatory process that 
includes opportunity for public comment. Thus, in response to suggestions by VMAC members 
that if approved, cefquinome should be prohibited from extra-label use preemptively, the director 
of CVM stated that FDA could not prohibit extra-label use merely as a precaution. Rather, the 
agency would have to establish “a very strong, credible case” based on a scientific determination 
that it posed a risk before attempting such a prohibition.257 As a result, concerns about the impact 
of off-label use could not be incorporated into a new drug’s risk assessment under GFI 152, even 
though approval for any use would automatically allow off-label use until FDA specifically 
prohibited it through a separate, formal rulemaking process. 
 Despite the uphill battle it knew it would face, FDA attempted a formal prohibition of 
extra-label use of all cephalosporins in animals in July of 2008, citing NARMS data that showed 
increased resistance in animal and human isolates since cephalosporins were introduced into 
animal agriculture, as well as concerns about cross-resistance.258 However, after receiving 
extensive comments on the order of prohibition, FDA decided to withdraw the rule on November 
26, 2008, until the agency was able to review and respond to all the comments.259 Animal drug 
manufacturers, trade associations representing food animal producers, and veterinarians 
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submitted comments objecting to the original order because they argued it was too broad in its 
ban of all extra-label uses, and that FDA had not met the legal standard for enacting the 
prohibition because the order was based on the precautionary principle rather than sound 
science.260 Though FDA said that after considering the comments, they would reissue the 
prohibition if they felt it was appropriate, the agency was silent on the matter for several years. It 
was not until January of 2012 that FDA addressed extra-label use of cephalosporins, issuing a 
narrower prohibition that addressed the pharmaceutical and animal production industries’ 
concerns about the breadth of the original ban, but rejecting arguments that the agency failed to 
meet the legal standard for prohibition.261 
 The weaknesses of FDA’s informal strategy for regulating animal antibiotics that were 
brought to light during the cephalosporins case underscored the influence of the animal 
pharmaceutical industry, and perhaps to a lesser extent the food animal production industry, on 
FDA’s decision-making, as well as the constraints placed on the agency by the costs of formal 
rulemaking procedures. Both of these factors seemed to outweigh the pressure from members of 
Congress, the scientific community, and health and public interest groups for FDA to place more 
restrictive regulations on antibiotic use in animal agriculture through formal rulemaking. After 
the several-month-long battle over the language in GFI 152, industry interests appeared to 
triumph over the interests of public health and consumer advocates in narrowly tailoring the 
language to limit what could be considered under the human health consequences assessment. 
The cefquinome case demonstrated that even drugs critical to human medicine could be 
approved for animal use if they were not essential for treating foodborne illnesses due to the way 
in which the guidance prioritized certain health concerns over others. Though the VMAC voted 
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that cefquinome should not be considered safe for animal use due to the risk to human health, 
under GFI 152, FDA and the drug sponsor found that cefquinome should be classified as a 
medium risk, which meant it could be approved with some post-approval risk management 
measures. GFI 152 also did not allow FDA to consider the availability of other treatment options 
or the risks of off-label use as a part of its risk assessment, both of which were major concerns of 
scientists and public health officials.262  
The cefquinome case provided important insights into the effectiveness of FDA’s new 
strategy. In evaluating the new animal drug application, FDA officials stressed that if drug 
sponsors followed the parameters of the guidance in their application, FDA would abide by the 
outcome recommended by the guidance’s risk assessment despite the fact that the guidance was 
nonbinding. This led to a safety evaluation that many considered inadequate, raising questions 
about the ability of the new strategy to keep unsafe drugs off the market. Furthermore, FDA was 
unable to preemptively ban extra-label use of cefquinome as a stipulation of its approval for 
therapy due to procedural rules. FDA was also substantially delayed when it attempted a separate 
extra-label ban on all cephalosporins due to the ability for pharmaceutical companies and food 
animal producers to challenge the prohibition during the rulemaking process. These weaknesses 
indicated not only that FDA’s informal regulatory strategy was inadequate in protecting human 
health, but also that the agency was hemmed in by the need for industry support in order to avoid 










The Obama Administration and Judicious Use  
 Over the past decade, the need for industry support had outweighed Congress’ concerns 
that FDA’s informal regulatory strategy was not sufficiently protective of human health in 
directing FDA’s behavior. However, by 2007, Congress would no longer be ignored. After 
several years of expressing concerns in hearings and sending letters to FDA, Congress decided to 
take a more direct approach to ensure the agency would heed its directions. In 2007, the House 
Appropriations Committee wrote in its report on the 2008 FDA appropriations bill that it was 
“concerned that simply satisfying the requirements of the guidance document is not adequate to 
protect human health.”263 Specifically, it noted that the committee felt the guidance did not 
assign enough weight to the impact of resistance to drugs that are highly important to human 
medicine but not used for treating foodborne illnesses.264 To address those concerns, the 
committee ordered FDA to “reevaluate the basis on which it makes such decisions” and provide 
a report to the committee by November of that year. The committee further stated that it was 
concerned that the agency had still not finished its review of the safety of the subtherapeutic use 
of penicillin in animal feeds, and ordered FDA to finish and publish its review by June 30, 
2008.265  
Congress had used the same tactic in the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to prevent 
FDA from moving forward with its 1977 proposals to restrict subtherapeutic uses of penicillin 
and tetracyclines, after FDA had decided to enact the rules despite the concerns voiced to agency 
officials by many members of Congress in hearings. By directly intervening through the 
appropriations process in order to ensure FDA was prioritizing its concerns, Congress indicated 
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that it would no longer allow FDA to overlook congressional recommendations. This episode 
provides another example of a failure by FDA to adequately balance the feedback it receives, 
which often results in reduced autonomy for the agency, carried out here by Congressional 
intervention.  
 In August of 2008, Congress took another active step in directing FDA regulation of 
antibiotic use in animals by amending the Animal Drug User Fee Act to mandate that FDA 
collect and publish data on antibiotic use in food-producing animals each year.266 Though public 
health advocates had requested that the agency implement such a practice for many years, the 
animal pharmaceutical industry had opposed reporting requirements, citing concerns about 
revealing confidential business information. This victory for public health advocates showed 
their increasing influence after years of neglect by FDA.  
 With some members of Congress still dissatisfied with FDA’s handling of animal 
antibiotic use, PAMTA was reintroduced into the 111th Congress in March of 2009 with 
unprecedented support in both the House and the Senate.267 On this iteration, Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid served as the primary sponsor of the Senate bill, along with 18 other 
cosponsors, two of whom were Republicans. The House bill also had more supporters than 
earlier versions of the bill had garnered. Though both bills died on the floor, the large number of 
sponsors supporting the House and Senate bills (127 and 19, respectively) indicated that 
Congress was paying attention to the issue once again, and that a growing number of members 
were dissatisfied with FDA’s slow pace on the issue. 
 During a July 2009 hearing on PAMTA, FDA gave its support to the bill and signaled a 
shift in strategy. Joshua Sharfstein, Principal Deputy Commissioner at FDA, told the House 
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Rules Committee that growth promotion and feed efficiency uses of antibiotics in animals should 
not be considered judicious use, and that the agency supported ending the practice.268 This 
statement was the first public admission by FDA that it did not find production uses of 
antibiotics in animals to be safe, and indicated to Congress that the agency would take bold new 
steps to regulate the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics. While Sharfstein noted that the agency 
hoped to restrict production uses in a timely manner, he said that FDA hoped to accomplish its 
goals “without expending a tremendous amount of resources in the process.” These statements 
provided a clear signal to Congress that the agency recognized Congress’s concerns about FDA’s 
slow progress on the issue of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals. FDA indicated that it 
would respond by altering its approach from looking at drug approvals one at a time, to 
restricting all antibiotics used for purposes considered “non-judicious” by the agency. Sharfstein 
also commented that the current procedures needed to withdraw animal drug approvals were 
“very burdensome on the agency,”269 indicating that the agency was also conscious of its 
resource constraints, and that FDA might not be able to pursue formal withdrawals for broad 
categories of antibiotic use. 
 FDA finally appeared to be responding to Congress and public health advocates by taking 
more aggressive action on subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals. Nevertheless, FDA would not 
heed Congress’ concerns entirely at the expense of other key stakeholders opposed to tighter 
control of animal antibiotic use, such as the pharmaceutical and animal production industries, as 
well as veterinarians and animal feed producers. With plans for more restrictive regulation 
looming, FDA published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in March of 2010, 
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soliciting comments on improvements to its Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD).270 The VFD was 
created in response to the passage of the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996, which 
determined that certain new animal drugs should only be approved for use in feed under the 
order and supervision of a veterinarian.271 Though there were few animal drugs approved under 
VFD at the time FDA published the notice, FDA stated that they intended to respond to concerns 
from stakeholders that the VFD process was too burdensome in order to prepare for an increase 
in VFD-approved drugs in the future. While the notice indicated that FDA intended to require 
more veterinary oversight for antibiotic use in animal feed, it also demonstrated that the agency 
was committed to ensuring that the concerns of industry stakeholders were addressed in the 
process. 
In June of 2010, FDA took the first major steps in its new strategy by introducing a draft 
of a new guidance document designed to promote the judicious use of medically important 
antibiotics in food-producing animals.272 The draft of GFI 209 recommended the introduction of 
measures to limit the use of medically important antibiotics in food-producing animals to those 
necessary to assure animal health and to uses that included veterinary oversight and consultation. 
FDA also noted in the draft that it intended to issue further guidance in the future to provide 
specific recommendations for implementing the document. The publication of this draft guidance 
revealed for the first time the key aspects of FDA’s new strategy for addressing the human health 
hazards posed by animal antibiotic use, which would be implemented through several steps in 
the coming years.  
																																																								
270 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Notice, “Veterinary Feed Directive,” Federal Register 75, no. 59 (March 29, 
2010): 15387.  
271 Animal Drug Availability Act, Public L. No. 104-250, 110 Stat. 3151 (1994).  
272 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Notice, “Draft Guidance: The Judicious Use of Medically Important 





The guidance reflected a careful balancing of the concerns of stakeholders by FDA. On 
one side, a substantial cohort in Congress was intent on forcing the agency to heed public health 
concerns and take concrete action after decades of delay. On the other side, industry stakeholders 
opposed restrictive regulation and could exploit procedural requirements in the rulemaking 
process to delay action. FDA’s strategy was an attempt to appease both camps. The decision to 
look broadly at categories of subtherapeutic antibiotic use, instead of regulating drug by drug, 
indicated that FDA recognized the growing frustration among public health and consumer 
advocates, as well as members of Congress, with FDA’s slow progress on the issue over the past 
several decades. FDA countered this with the choice of an informal, non-binding action, which 
revealed the power of industry stakeholders and the resource constraints facing the agency. 
Rather than initiating a formal ban on all production uses of antibiotics in food-producing 
animals, FDA substituted a weaker action that focused on working collaboratively with 
pharmaceutical and food animal production stakeholders to avoid a costly rulemaking process 
that would be held up by industry actors at every turn. 
An unfortunate consequence of FDA’s balanced strategy was that it failed to earn the full 
support of any key stakeholders. While health and public interest groups, and members of 
Congress advocating for their position, felt the voluntary approach was too weak, veterinarians, 
pharmaceutical companies, and food animal producers expressed concern about broad 
restrictions on antibiotic use like those proposed by GFI 209. In a July 2010 hearing of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee, a representative from the AVMA stated that the veterinary 
community did not believe that restricting antibiotic drugs to prevent disease in animals was in 




veterinary oversight.273 Declining to address the draft guidance directly, a representative of the 
Animal Health Institute at the hearing said that the animal pharmaceutical industry appreciated 
FDA’s cooperative approach and that it would work closely with the agency on this issue.274 The 
food animal production industry, however, was more outspoken. While a representative from 
USDA avoided opposing the guidance directly, he stated that USDA felt FDA’s current risk-
assessment process was “preferable to the approach that broadly eliminates antimicrobials for 
specific uses,” which was essentially the purpose of GFI 209.275 The National Pork Producers 
Council was vocal in its opposition to the guidance, and even published an opinion piece in USA 
Today that argued that there was no scientific foundation for restricting antibiotic use in food 
animal production.276 Without full support on either side, FDA faced potential challenges from 
multiple stakeholders as it continued to carry out its new strategy. 
The first major challenge to FDA’s regulatory strategy for antibiotics in animals came a 
year later in May of 2011, when NRDC, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Food Animal 
Concerns Trust, Public Citizen, and the Union of Concerned Scientists jointly sued FDA for 
failing to respond to the petitions that the organizations had filed in March of 1999 and April of 
2005. The groups asked a federal judge to order the agency to withdraw approvals for 
subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines, in accordance with their 1977 proposals.277 
The plaintiffs claimed that FDA had not met its legal obligation to act on its own safety findings, 
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which would compel them to initiate withdrawal proceedings for subtherapeutic uses of these 
antibiotics. This lawsuit was the type of costly engagement FDA had been attempting to avoid 
from the pharmaceutical industry by sidestepping the formal rulemaking process. Ironically, it 
was this informal regulatory strategy that ultimately landed them in a legal battle with health and 
consumer groups. 
A few months after the lawsuit was filed, FDA sent letters to petitioners formally denying 
their March 1999 and April 2005 petitions.278 Though the plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their 
claim regarding the petitions, they separately filed a supplemental complaint claiming that 
FDA’s responses to the petitions were arbitrary and capricious, and thus in violation of the 
FD&C Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.279 A month later, FDA published a notice 
withdrawing its 1977 proposals for withdrawal of subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and 
tetracyclines in animal feed.280 After carrying out these actions, FDA argued that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were moot. Nevertheless, on March 22, 2012, the judge ruled against FDA on both 
claims, finding that the agency unlawfully failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to complete 
withdrawal proceedings if it finds that an approved drug use is not safe. The court ordered FDA 
to carry out the withdrawal proceedings for the 1977 proposals. 
Though FDA appealed this decision, the court’s finding that an entirely voluntary 
approach to animal antibiotic regulation was unlawful played a role in shaping FDA’s strategy 
going forward. Internal FDA memos released under a Freedom of Information Act request reveal 
that FDA’s revisions of GFI 209 and its strategy for releasing its subsequent guidance, GFI 213, 
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were affected by NRDC’s legal challenge.281 In a memo from March 27, 2012, FDA suggested 
altering language in GFI 213 because the agency believed “it may be helpful in obtaining a 
favorable decision with respect to the second prong of the lawsuit.”282 FDA proposed changing a 
vague statement that the agency might consider further action if warranted by industry adoption 
rates by adding a 3-year timeline for reevaluation. This change was proposed in hopes of 
“assuaging the court’s concern that FDA is failing to protect the public health in accordance with 
FDCA by forecasting a possibility of appropriate regulatory action if necessary.”283 
On April 13, 2012, FDA published the final version of GFI 209, which reviewed the 
scientific evidence on the link between antibiotic use in animals and antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens in humans, and set out two principles for the judicious use of antibiotics in food-
producing animals.284 On the same day, FDA also issued a draft of GFI 213, which was meant to 
assist pharmaceutical companies in removing production uses from approved antibiotics, adding 
disease prevention, control, and treatment uses where appropriate, and changing the marketing 
status to require veterinary oversight.285 In conjunction with the two guidance documents, FDA 
published a draft of proposed regulation for improving the efficiency of its Veterinary Feed 
Directive Program in order to facilitate the transition of many over-the-counter drugs to VFD 
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status.286 These three documents were the cornerstone of FDA’s strategy of informal, voluntary 
regulation that the agency hoped would appease both industry and public health advocates. 
FDA emphasized its cooperative strategy in its press releases on the three documents. 
Michael Taylor, Deputy Director of Food at FDA, said that the significant change that allowed 
them to move forward with the strategy was “the willingness of many drug companies, 
veterinarians and animal producers to work collaboratively with FDA” on the issue.287 FDA’s 
claim that industry was cooperating was supported by a statement from the trade group 
representing the feed industry, which said it supported the guidance and FDA’s “collaborative 
approach on the issue.”288 The National Pork Producers Council, however, slammed the 
guidance for its restrictions on antibiotics that they claimed were extremely important to animal 
health and its heightened veterinary requirements, claiming that FDA did not provide compelling 
evidence for the new regulations.289 Among consumer and public health advocates, FDA’s 
strategy was met with a tepid response. While these groups expressed general support for the 
guidance documents as a first step, they were not satisfied with the voluntary nature of FDA’s 
approach.290 Once again, FDA’s hopes of appeasing both sides of the issue resulted in a strategy 
to which no party gave their full support.  
FDA’s recent progress on the issue did not satisfy Congress either. In its report on fiscal 
year 2013 FDA appropriations, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed FDA to finalize 
GFI 213 and report to Congress on compliance with the final guidance, with “further details 
about how FDA intends to meet its public health responsibilities” within 120 days of its 
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publication.291 Two months later, the House report on FDA appropriations also directed the 
agency to seek public comment on collecting more data on antibiotic use in food-producing 
animals and to collaborate with USDA to implement an approach for data collection.292 These 
reports indicated that Congress would continue to carefully monitor FDA’s behavior on this 
matter, and would limit the agency’s autonomy until Congress was satisfied with FDA’s ability 
adequately protect public health. 
FDA’s strategy was also being challenged in court, where NRDC and its fellow plaintiffs 
were fighting for their third complaint, challenging FDA’s recent dismissal of the 1999 and 2005 
petitions. On June 1, 2012, a federal judge ruled that the agency’s proffered grounds for 
dismissing the two petitions were arbitrary and capricious, rejecting the notion that FDA could 
substitute proposed voluntary measures for those mandated by statute.293 The judge also found 
that by failing to make findings as to the drugs’ safety, FDA “avoided the Congressionally 
mandated scheme for addressing drugs not shown to be safe,” and that the agency’s “eleventh 
hour response” of issuing the guidance documents did not relieve it of its responsibility to make 
such findings. As a result, the court ordered FDA to determine whether the scientific evidence 
supported the two citizen petitions, and initiate withdrawal proceedings for any drug use not 
found to be safe. In the fall of 2012, FDA appealed the decision, further delaying any formal 
action on subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals.294  
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Over the course of the next year, FDA made little progress on the issue, frustrating 
consumer and public health advocates, as well as members of Congress. Though FDA held 
meetings with veterinarians and the animal agriculture industry to discuss VFD improvements,295 
the agency failed to finalize GFI 213 and the VFD despite pressure from Congress. In June of 
2013, over a year after FDA had published its draft of GFI 213, the House report on 2014 FDA 
appropriations directed the agency to finalize the guidance before January 1, 2014, and to submit 
data to Congress that would allow them to track industry cooperation and FDA progress on the 
issue.296 
On December 12, 2013, FDA published the final version of GFI 213, which provided 
recommendations for pharmaceutical companies on how to comply with GFI 209 by changing 
product labels, and requested that the companies complete this process within three years.297 The 
guidance asked pharmaceutical companies to work voluntarily with the agency to review existing 
drug approvals for antibiotics, update the evidence for their use in disease control, prevention, or 
therapy, or consider withdrawing the drug from the market. On the same day, FDA also solicited 
comment on proposed changes to the VFD rule that would allow greater flexibility in the 
veterinary-client-patient relationship, reduce recordkeeping requirements, and allow some VFD 
drugs to be sold by unlicensed feed mills. 
The response to GFI 213 from the pharmaceutical industry was largely supportive, 
indicating that FDA had considered industry input in drafting the guidance and that the strategy 
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was indeed being implemented in collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry, as FDA 
claimed. Zoetis and Elanco, the pharmaceutical companies that together sponsored most of the 
drugs subject to the guidance, immediately announced their willingness to work with FDA to 
comply,298 and by June of 2014, FDA had secured the voluntary engagement of all affected 
pharmaceutical companies.299 Livestock and poultry groups also expressed their commitment to 
working with the agency on the issue, voicing appreciation for the collaborative process FDA 
had undertaken in crafting the strategy.300 
Consumer and public health advocates, however, were critical of the guidance, though 
they expressed some hope that the recent moves indicated that the agency was taking the issue 
more seriously. The Keep Antibiotics Working coalition voiced concerns that the guidance 
would not lead to any real reduction in antibiotics use, since pharmaceutical companies could 
ignore FDA’s recommendations, and food animal producers could switch from using antibiotics 
for growth promotion to using them for routine disease prevention instead.301 Many in the public 
health community, as well as some in Congress, echoed these concerns, and urged FDA to create 
an enforcement plan. Rep. Louise Slaughter, a microbiologist and longtime advocate for 
restricting animal antibiotic use, called the guidance “an inadequate response” that “[fell] 
woefully short of what is needed to address a public health crisis.”302 Concerned members of 
Congress supported several pieces of legislation designed to create mandatory restrictions that 
went further than FDA’s policies, including PAMTA and the Preventing Antibiotic Resistance 
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Act, introduced in March of 2015.303 Congress was also monitoring FDA’s progress on finalizing 
its strategy, and directed the agency to publish the final VFD rule by December of 2014.304 
Though FDA’s voluntary strategy continued to be challenged by consumer and public 
health groups and their supporters in Congress, the agency won a major victory in July of 2014, 
when the US Court of Appeals ruled in favor of FDA in a two-to-one decision to overturn the 
two district court decisions.305 The court found that the statute did not require FDA to hold 
hearings until it made a final determination on the drugs, and that the decision was thus left to 
agency discretion. This ruling validated FDA’s voluntary plan at a crucial time for the agency as 
it worked to implement the key steps in its strategy, and provided FDA with assurance that 
informal regulation could be substituted for formal rulemaking.  
The court’s decision coincided with a push by the Obama administration to make 
addressing the problem of antibiotic resistance a national priority. In early July, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) met to discuss a policy document on 
antibiotic resistance.306 Consumer and public health groups hoped the report would push FDA to 
go further than its current voluntary strategy, and sent a letter to PCAST urging them to 
recommend more aggressive steps for curbing animal antibiotic use.307 Three months later, 
President Obama issued an executive order, entitled “Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria,” 
which declared antibiotic resistance to be a “serious threat to public health and the economy” and 
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established an interagency task force to create a national action plan addressing the issue.308 
Simultaneously, the White House released its National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-
Resistant Bacteria, based on the PCAST report developed earlier that year.309 The strategy laid 
out five goals for action by the federal government, which included slowing the emergence of 
resistant bacteria, strengthening surveillance, improved testing and diagnostics for resistant 
infections, accelerating the development of new antibiotics, and improving international 
collaboration on the issue.310 By the end of 2014, the Obama administration had engaged in an 
unprecedented level of involvement on the issue of antibiotic resistance, providing the political 
capital needed for FDA to take strong action on animal antibiotic use. 
In March of 2015, the interagency task force released its National Action Plan for 
Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.311 Despite the hopes of consumer and public health 
advocates that the White House would pave the way for more aggressive steps by FDA, the 
action plan essentially restated the strategy FDA had already set out. With regard to animal 
antibiotic use, the plan outlined two major objectives: first, “to eliminate the use of medically 
important antibiotics for growth promotion in food-producing animals and bring under veterinary 
oversight other in-feed and in-water uses of antibiotics that are medically important for 
treatment, control, and prevention of disease;” and second, “to identify and implement measures 
to foster stewardship of antibiotics in animals.”312  In order to achieve the first goal, the plan 
directed FDA to complete the implementation of GFI 213 and finalize the VFD rule within one 
year. FDA was also instructed to complete all changes recommended by the two guidance 
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documents within three years, after which time growth promotion uses of medically important 
antibiotics would not be permitted, and all other water or feed uses of these drugs would require 
veterinary oversight. The plan also provided milestones for progress assessment, and goals for 
outreach, training, and transparency with regard to FDA’s actions on the issue. To achieve the 
second objective, the action plan directed FDA, in partnership with USDA, to develop and 
implement outreach programs for veterinarians and animal producers to advance antibiotic 
stewardship, and to promote public-private partnerships with public health, pharmaceutical, and 
agricultural stakeholders in order to facilitate the implementation of best practices and effective 
interventions. The plan also set specific goals for monitoring, data collection, and reporting in 
order to gauge the effectiveness of FDA’s strategies. 
 Though consumer and public health groups expressed support for the creation of a 
comprehensive plan to tackle antibiotic resistance, many criticized the plan for its inadequate 
provisions for addressing animal antibiotic use. Rep. Louise Slaughter said that “the 
administration has fallen woefully short of taking meaningful action to curb the overuse of 
antibiotics in healthy food animals,” and emphasized that pursuing FDA’s voluntary policy was 
the wrong path forward.313 NRDC’s statement expressed similar concerns, and added that “the 
national plan perpetuates a massive loophole in FDA's existing approach to the use of antibiotics 
in animal agriculture” by allowing routine disease prevention uses of antibiotics to continue.314 
Despite unprecedented attention paid to the issue of antibiotic resistance by the White House, 
FDA appeared poised to continue with its voluntary strategy. 
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On June 2, 2015, FDA published the final VFD rule, completing the last step in the three-
pronged approach it had initiated five years before.315 In anticipation of the increased number of 
drug uses falling under requirements for veterinary oversight as part of FDA’s judicious use 
strategy, the amended VFD allowed for greater flexibility with regard to several aspects of the 
rule in order to improve the efficiency of the VFD process. Based on feedback that FDA 
received during the formal comment period and in the public meetings that FDA held throughout 
the country in 2013, FDA altered the provisions relating to the veterinary-client-patient 
relationship in order to allow greater state-by-state flexibility, rather than mandating that all 
veterinarians issuing VFDs meet the federally defined standards. The final rule also clarified 
record-keeping requirements and removed VFD drugs from the definition of Category II drugs, 
which require a withdrawal period, so that VFD drugs would instead be categorized on case-by-
case basis.316  
On the same day that FDA announced the final VFD rule, the White House held its 
“Forum on Antibiotic Stewardship,” bringing together more than 150 stakeholders involved in 
human and animal health as part of President Obama’s national strategy to combat antibiotic 
resistance.317 The forum was a public display of industry cooperation with the White House’s 
new plan that furnished FDA with the political support necessary to press forward with its 
judicious use strategy, despite criticism from consumer and public health advocates. At the 
forum, the AVMA lauded FDA’s new VFD rule, crediting the AVMA’s “early and ongoing 
collaboration with FDA” for an outcome that was “in the best interests of animal health, public 
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health, and the veterinary profession.”318 The National Chicken Council, along with other food 
animal producer organizations, participated in the forum and publicly expressed support for all 
three documents in FDA’s judicious use strategy.319 Other stakeholders from animal agriculture, 
including several large animal pharmaceutical companies, the American Feed Industry 
Association, and major food producers, used the opportunity to announce their own antibiotic 
stewardship initiatives, including a commitment from Tyson Foods to eliminate the use of human 
antibiotics from its U.S. broiler chicken flocks by September of 2017.320 
The public support from industry stakeholders for the White House’s strategy was not 
matched by consumer and public health groups, which gave the forum and FDA’s final VFD rule 
a lukewarm response. A senior analyst for the Keep Antibiotics Working coalition said that 
while the group appreciated that the White House was giving the issue the attention it needed, 
many were “troubled by the fact that most of the consumer advocacy organizations” that had 
been working for decades to address antibiotic use in animal agriculture were not invited to 
participate in the forum.321 NRDC expressed a similar sentiment, and added that FDA’s VFD 
was a positive step, but did not go far enough by failing to include data collection on antibiotic 
use.322 
During the Obama Administration, FDA’s regulation of antibiotic use in animal 
agriculture was swept into a broader national strategy to combat antibiotic resistance, giving the 
agency more political backing on the issue than ever before. As part of the administration’s focus 
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on the judicious use of antibiotics, FDA’s regulatory approach moved firmly away from product-
by-product regulation, and towards broad guidelines regarding how and when antibiotics should 
be used in animal agriculture. In order to achieve this, FDA relied on voluntary guidance 
documents and the cooperation of key industry participants, including pharmaceutical 
companies, feed manufacturers, and food animal producers. Ultimately, FDA succeeded in 
getting the support of industry stakeholders by involving them in the development of GFI 209, 
GFI 213, and the revised VFD, the three key documents that formed its strategy. Despite 
sustained attempts to push the agency towards formal regulation of subtherapeutic animal 
antibiotic use by consumer and public health groups and their advocates in Congress, FDA 
solidified its voluntary strategy with the publication of the final VFD rule in 2015. 
 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Since Thomas Jukes made his incredible discovery that antibiotics from pharmaceutical 
waste could speed the growth of animals in his laboratory and the Swann Committee revealed 
the dangers of this practice, FDA has been caught in an unwinnable battle among a host of 
stakeholders vying for influence over the agency. Despite FDA’s early recognition in the mid-
1970s that the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal agriculture posed a significant health 
risk, FDA spent decades attempting to find a viable path towards regulation. Constrained by the 
demands of external stakeholders and the costs of regulation, FDA continued to display an 
inability to effectively curtail subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture over the course 
of more than forty years.   
FDA’s long history of regulating subtherapeutic antibiotic use reveals a great deal about 




Interpreting this case through the framework of external signals yields important insights into the 
way FDA balances the feedback of stakeholders with the costs of regulatory action, calibrating 
its behavior to maximize positive political feedback and minimize cost. Though certain interests 
may dominate FDA in the short term, taking a broader temporal view of FDA’s behavior 
suggests that the agency responds to a diverse range of feedback. Thus, this case indicates that 
external signals theory provides a more appropriate frame through which to interpret FDA 
behavior over the long term, and rejects the idea that the agency’s behavior is determined solely 
by Congress, industry, or the public interest. Nevertheless, an analysis of external signals does 
not fully explain FDA’s behavior; the history of the agency’s regulation of subtherapeutic 
antibiotic use in animal agriculture brings to light several other factors that influence FDA’s 
decision-making. This chapter takes a broad view of the case and identifies key trends in FDA’s 
behavior over the period between 1970 and 2015. Placing these trends in context, the discussion 
turns to an analysis of external signals in an effort to explain the observed trends in FDA’s 
behavior. The chapter concludes by examining factors that impact FDA’s decision-making in 
this case that are not explained by an external signals approach, and addressing the lessons that 
can be drawn from this case. 
 
Trends in FDA’s Behavior: An External Signals Approach 
 Throughout the course of this case, FDA employed a number of different regulatory 
strategies in its attempts to combat antibiotic resistance through restrictions on antibiotic use in 
animal feed. Early regulatory endeavors centered on careful study of the emerging scientific 
evidence regarding the development of resistance and observation of the United Kingdom’s 




the early 1970s by commissioning a task force to review the scientific evidence, and 
subsequently requiring sponsors of any antibiotic-containing feed compounds to submit data 
establishing the safety of these products. When the advisory committee impaneled to review this 
data recommended that FDA withdraw approval for certain growth promotion and feed 
efficiency uses of penicillin and two tetracycline drugs, FDA decided to move forward with 
formal withdrawal proceedings for the drugs in 1977.  
 An analysis of the external signals FDA was receiving at this time suggests that this early 
strategy was driven primarily by growing concern in the scientific community and by 
international regulatory efforts, which FDA was following closely. Though pharmaceutical 
companies were required to submit data establishing the safety of their products, they did not 
appear to be providing significant resistance to FDA’s regulatory efforts. Other key industry 
stakeholders, including food animal producers and feed manufacturers, were also not providing 
public resistance to FDA’s handling of the issue prior to the proposed withdrawals in 1977, 
which may have led FDA to believe it had the political support necessary to proceed with formal 
rulemaking. Because formal rulemaking is the statutorily mandated process for withdrawing 
approval for drugs that have not been shown to be safe, it is not surprising that FDA would select 
this method in its first attempt to address the issue, particularly in the absence of strong negative 
feedback from stakeholders. 
 After refusing to yield to Congress’ concerns regarding its 1977 proposals, FDA 
experienced a sharp reduction in autonomy. In several hearings held on the issue after FDA’s 
proposals were published, members of Congress representing agricultural districts and other 
sympathetic Republicans expressed doubt about the strength of the scientific evidence that the 




antibiotics in animal feed. Instead of surrendering to the concerns of a significant contingent in 
Congress, as well as the AVMA, USDA, and livestock and poultry interests, FDA decided to 
push ahead with its proposals. This decision demonstrates the consequences for FDA when it 
fails to properly adjust its approach in response to feedback from key stakeholders: here, FDA’s 
miscalculation of the strength of its own position with relation to the negative feedback it was 
receiving from Congress and other important stakeholders led to a significant reduction in 
agency autonomy for several years, as Congress used the appropriations process to direct FDA to 
delay action on the issue. 
 FDA’s activity related to the issue during the 1980s was therefore limited to reviewing 
new scientific evidence and carrying out additional studies to clarify the relationship between 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal feed and drug-resistant disease in humans. Despite 
continued statements by FDA officials that the agency believed subtherapeutic antibiotic use in 
animals posed a hazard for human health and limits on antibiotic use in animal agriculture were 
necessary, FDA took no active steps to regulate the practice from 1980 to the mid-1990s. During 
this period, several breakthrough studies were published that should have provided FDA with 
firmer grounds for restricting antibiotic use in animal feed, as they got closer to establishing the 
“direct link” that those opposing FDA’s attempts in the past had questioned. Why, then, did FDA 
remain silent on the issue for nearly fifteen years?  
 An analysis of the feedback FDA was receiving at the time helps answer this question. 
During the early 1980s, Congress used the appropriations process to intervene in FDA’s 
regulation of this issue for several years, directing FDA to carry out studies on the link between 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use on farms and resistant pathogens in humans. Each time it requested 




study was completed. Thus, from 1980 until 1984, FDA had no choice but to postpone taking 
action on subtherapeutic antibiotic use on farms. During the mid-1980s, key industry 
stakeholders were also vocally opposing regulation, as exhibited in the comments of the 
cattlemen and pork producers during the 1984 Congressional hearing, and more subtly by 
officials from USDA. Meanwhile, FDA’s CVM was under heightened scrutiny from Congress 
on a number of other issues, such as their failure to prevent the illegal marketing and sale of 
animal drugs and concerns about the use of carcinogenic substances. Furthermore, these events 
were all taking place during the Reagan administration, which was famously hostile towards 
regulation and thus unlikely to provide any political support (and perhaps likely to provide 
disincentives) for regulatory action on this issue. Collectively, these factors were able to move 
the regulation of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture down FDA’s priority list, as 
the political and budgetary costs of taking action became increasingly prohibitive. Given these 
costs, the sustained attention paid to the issue by the scientific community and consumer and 
public health advocates during this period was unable to provide sufficient political motivation 
for FDA to take action. 
 FDA’s trend of inaction slowly shifted during the early 1990s, eventually transitioning to 
a strategy of informal regulation that became the basis of FDA’s actions on subtherapeutic 
antibiotic use in animal agriculture for the next twenty years. Between 1995 and 2003, FDA took 
a sequence of steps to create an informal regulatory framework for addressing this issue, 
beginning in 1996 with the creation of NARMS, an interagency effort to monitor the 
development and spread of antibiotic resistance. FDA followed this with a series of guidance 
documents that established that the agency would consider the potential emergence of resistance 




evaluate this risk. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, FDA conducted safety assessments for 
new animal antibiotic drug applications and for approved antibiotic uses under these new 
guidelines. 
 This period saw not only renewed momentum at FDA for regulatory action on 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals, but also a major substitution of informal guidance 
documents for formal rulemaking. During the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, scientific evidence 
had amassed that pointed to a direct connection between subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals 
and antibiotic-resistant infections in humans. As a result, several European countries enacted 
strict limits on antibiotic use in agriculture, and major health institutions such as WHO and CDC 
recommended that production uses of medically important antibiotics be banned. At the same 
time, consumer and public health organizations continued to push FDA to take action on the 
issue. These influences likely played a significant role in FDA’s decision to take up the issue 
once again. 
 FDA’s decision to substitute informal guidance for formal rulemaking allowed them to 
respond to the concerns of the scientific and public health communities in a way that attracted 
less opposition and used fewer agency resources than formal regulatory procedure. During this 
time, FDA was increasingly utilizing informal rulemaking to achieve its objectives across many 
sectors. After FDA rendered its guidance documents nonbinding in 1992, revoking a previous 
rule, the agency began to rely on guidance documents for more flexible and responsive 
regulation and engaged regulated industries and regulatory beneficiaries in the drafting 
process.323 As FDA was rolling out its guidance-based strategy, it was learning the price of 
attempting formal rulemaking against the opposition of industry during its five-year battle with 
Bayer over sarafloxacin withdrawal. 
																																																								




 The final trend in FDA’s regulation of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture 
was a shift from product-by-product regulation to broad principles of judicious use that were 
implemented through informal actions. By 2005, FDA’s strategy of assessing the safety of each 
drug use through qualitative risk assessment was frustrating consumer and public health groups, 
as well as their advocates in Congress, who felt the strategy was weak, ineffective, and slow. 
This dissatisfaction culminated in a second proposal from public interest groups to withdraw 
approval for routine growth promotion and disease prevention uses of seven antibiotics used in 
animal feed. Meanwhile, the controversy over approval for cephalosporin use in animal 
agriculture revealed the weaknesses in FDA’s prior approach, drawing criticism and ultimately 
direct intervention by Congress in 2007.  
 These factors all contributed to a clear shift in strategy that began with a hearing in 2009, 
in which the Obama administration signaled that they would create a new plan for antibiotic 
regulation that focused on judicious use. As public health advocates had hoped, FDA determined 
that production uses of antibiotics were not considered judicious and set out to discontinue this 
practice. However, FDA planned to implement its new strategy through voluntary 
recommendations put forth in a series of guidance documents, which would achieve FDA’s goals 
only with the cooperation of industry stakeholders. After years of courting pharmaceutical 
companies, animal producers, animal feed manufacturers, and veterinarians, FDA rolled out a 
voluntary strategy that had support from industry stakeholders and the White House. Though a 
legal challenge to FDA’s reliance on voluntary guidance influenced several aspects of the final 
documents (most notably the inclusion of a timeline for reevaluation of FDA’s plan), the 
political and budgetary benefits of a voluntary strategy backed by the White House and industry 




Lessons for Future Strategies  
 An analysis of external signals provides distinct insight into how and why FDA makes 
regulatory decisions in complex environments. Nevertheless, several other key factors influenced 
FDA’s regulatory behavior in this case and warrant consideration, though a full treatment of 
these topics is outside the scope of this paper. Understanding how these factors, in conjunction 
with feedback from external stakeholders and budgetary costs, impact FDA’s behavior provides 
important lessons for the development of more effective strategies for influencing regulatory 
outcomes. 
 Throughout the FDA’s regulation of subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture, 
science plays a major role in determining the options available to FDA and the firmness of the 
agency’s position. Before FDA can take regulatory action, it must have a strong scientific basis 
for its decision in order to avoid, or at least weaken, challenges from the regulated industry and 
Congress. Without a strong body of evidence indicating the need for regulation, formal 
regulatory efforts generally prove to be a waste of agency resources. Science is also used as a 
tool by those opposed to regulation in order to delay or prevent FDA action. In this case, 
stakeholders accomplished this both by requesting additional scientific studies to strengthen the 
grounds for any regulatory action, and by finding or generating scientific evidence that countered 
the agency’s claims. Due to the uncertainty inherent in science, navigating a regulatory problem 
that involves challenging scientific questions, such as the emergence, spread, and risks of 
antibiotic resistance, can constrain FDA’s ability to act. This challenge is particularly relevant in 
the complex environment of the food system, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.  
   Institutional constraints also influenced FDA’s decision-making. From the late 1970s 




strong action to curtail the use of antibiotics in animal feed. On the whole, these groups were 
well organized, unremitting, and successful in courting an ardent cohort of advocates in 
Congress. Nevertheless, they were considerably less effective in influencing FDA’s behavior 
than industry stakeholders that opposed action. While there are likely several reasons for this 
imbalance, the conservative nature of the regulatory process is one major factor. Due to the 
burdensome procedural requirements for rulemaking, FDA’s regulatory process is biased against 
taking action, providing numerous opportunities for those opposed to regulation to step in and 
block FDA action or create additional resistance that makes the action more costly. The 
resource-intensive nature of rulemaking, particularly when the regulated industry in opposition is 
organized, powerful, and well-funded, makes it much more difficult for those seeking regulatory 
action to obtain their desired outcome than it is for those opposed to regulation. While informal 
regulation through guidance documents decreases the costs of regulation by reducing procedural 
requirements, its nonbinding status renders it ineffective without the support of the regulated 
industry, giving them the upper hand in this arena as well. As was evident in the case of 
antibiotic regulation in animal agriculture, consumer and public health advocates seeking 
regulation are fighting an uphill battle, even when science and public opinion are on their side. 
 At the intersection of science and institutional constraints are the standards for scientific 
evaluation and the burden of proof, which are crucial factors in shaping regulatory outcomes. 
The questions of who must provide evidence in order for an action to be taken and which bar 
they must meet were central to several key moments in the story of subtherapeutic antibiotic 
regulation. The shift to a standard of “reasonable certainty of no harm” in the early 2000s 
marked a significant change in momentum for FDA, establishing that drug sponsors were 




humans. These factors also played a role throughout the agency’s attempts to deal with new 
scientific evidence, as the burden for proving harm or safety shifted between FDA and the 
regulated industry. When the burden of proof was placed on sponsors to prove safety, FDA was 
in a significantly stronger position than when they were required to prove harm in order to take 
regulatory action. 
 A final element of this story that is not discussed extensively here is the role of 
presidential administrations in changing FDA’s trajectory, both on a particular issue and in its 
overall regulatory strategy. The White House is able to exert influence over FDA both through 
its political appointees, which can drive the agenda set by the President, or by providing the 
agency with political capital and public support to carry out a particular action. Both mechanisms 
of influence likely shaped the observed trends in FDA’s behavior in this case. This was 
particularly evident in the 1980s, given that FDA’s decade of inaction on subtherapeutic 
antibiotics coincided with the Reagan administration, which is commonly considered the most 
anti-regulatory administration in recent decades. The active role of the Obama administration, 
beginning in 2009, in spurring national action to combat antibiotic resistance and pushing a 
judicious use strategy provides another clear example. Future research should look more closely 
at this interesting question. 
 FDA’s efforts to regulate subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture over four and 
a half decades paint a picture of an agency severely constrained by external forces. FDA’s belief 
that the routine use of antibiotics in animal feed posed a hazard to human health that necessitated 
regulation never wavered after its original assessment of the issue in the mid-1970s. 
Nevertheless, FDA was not able to carry out the regulatory actions it believed were necessary 




requirements, and its budget. Even with consumer and public health advocates pushing the 
agency to carry out its original objectives, FDA was unable to effectively uphold its mission to 
protect the public health by assuring the safety of the food supply.  
 Though FDA’s recent informal regulatory strategy may prove to be effective in reducing 
the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture, the agency’s need to rely on a voluntary plan that 
requires industry cooperation does not bode well for its ability to effectively protect the public 
health from risks in the food system. The lessons we can draw from FDA’s behavior in the 
regulation of antibiotic use in animal feed over 45 years about the dynamic nature of its decision-
making, its constant attempts to balance external feedback, and the power of procedural 
constraints can help us better understand future regulatory outcomes. Concern about the safety 
and sustainability of the American food system is growing rapidly, leading to greater scrutiny of 
FDA’s ability to regulate health risks in the food supply by consumers and academics alike. This 








Amanor-Boadu, Vincent and Kara Ross. Industry Trend Report: Animal Feed Manufacturing.  
(Kansas State University, May 2011). 
http://www.agmanager.info/agribus/Other/IndustryReport_AnimalFeed.pdf. 
 
American Public Health Association. “Antibiotics in Livestock Feed May Endanger Human  




American Veterinary Medical Association. “Antibiotic use & resistance: AVMA’s efforts seen in  




Animal Drug Availability Act. Public L. No. 104-250, 110 Stat. 3151 (1994). 
 
Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clarification Act of 1994. Public L. No. 103-396, 108 Stat. 4153  
(1994). 
 
“Antibiotics Used in Farm Animals Causing Hard-to-Treat Infections in Humans.” Tufts  




Biotech Week. “Abbott Laboratories; FDA Plans to Ban Two Poultry Drugs That Result in  
Human Exposure to Resistant Bacteria.” November 15, 2000. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/205508569?accountid=15172.  
 
Brayton, Jenna. “The White House Hosts a Forum on Combating Antibiotic Resistance.” White  
House Press Office, June 2, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/02/white-
house-hosts-forum-combating-antibiotic-resistance. 
 
Brownlee, Shannon. "A LOOK AT . . . Antibiotics in the Food Chain; FARMERS WHO GIVE  
ANIMALS DRUGS to make them Grow to Market Weight Faster Unwittingly 
Contribute to Antibiotic-Resistant Disease in Humans. the FDA has the Evidence; it's 
Time for Government to Curb this Practice.; what we really Pay for Cheap Meat." The 
Washington Post, May 21, 2000. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/408607940?accountid=15172. 
 
Busch, Alaina. “FDA Presses Ahead on New Animal Antibiotic Policies with Series of  
Meetings.” InsideHealthPolicy.Com's Inside Health Reform 5, no. 11. March 13, 2013. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1316062734?accountid=15172. 
 




Action.” InsideHealthPolicy.com's Daily Brief, December 12, 2013. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1492002602?accountid=15172.  
 
Calia, Frank M, and Morton I Rapoport. “The Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feeds.” JAMA 229.9  
(1974): 1212–12. doi:10.1001/jama.1974.03230470054028. 
 
Center for Food Safety. Factory Farms: Antibiotics in Distiller Grains (2013).  
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ff_antibiotics_fact-sheet_15425.pdf. 
 
Ciment, James. “FDA Proposes Measuring Antibiotics in Feed.” British Medical Journal  
318.7187 (1999): 829. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1115268/?tool=pmcentrez.  
 
Clouse, Rebecca. “Nursing Organizations Call for Phase-Out of Agricultural Practices That  
Promote Antibiotic Resistance.” Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice 7.1 (2006): 17–22.  
doi:10.1177/1527154405283441.  
 
Cohen, M., and R. Tauxe. “Drug-Resistant Salmonella in the United States: an Epidemiologic  
Perspective.” Science 234.4779 (1986): 964–69. doi:10.1126/science.3535069. 
 
Dean, Wesley R, and H. Morgan Scott. “Antagonistic Synergy: Process and Paradox in the  
Development of New Agricultural Antimicrobial Regulations.” Agriculture and Human 
Values 22.4 (2005): 79–89. doi:10.1007/s10460-005-3403-y. 
 
Durkin, Erin. “FDA Rule Outlining Veterinarians' Oversight of Feed-Use Antibiotics Is Key Part  
of New White House Plan.” InsideHealthPolicy.com's Inside Health Reform 7.22 (June 3, 
2015). http://search.proquest.com/docview/1685156421?accountid=15172.  
 
Elliott, John. “Antibiotics in Feed Still OK.” JAMA 242.14 (1979): 1464–64.  
doi:10.1001/jama.1979.03300140010004. 
 
Environmental Defense, American Academy of Pediatrics, American Public Health Association,  
Food Animal Concerns Trust, and Union of Concerned Scientists. Citizen Petition  
Seeking Withdrawal of Approvals of Certain Herdwide/Flockwide Uses of Critically and 
Highly Important Antibiotics Pursuant to Guidance #152. April 7. 2015. 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/05p0139/05p-0139-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf.  
 
Exec. Order No. 13676, 79 FR 5693, “Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.” September 23,  
2014. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-09-23/pdf/2014-22805.pdf. 
 
Fairley, Peter. “FDA Weighs Animal-Feed Policy.” Chemical Week 161.10 (1999): 10.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/222502983?accountid=15172.  
 
Falkow, Stanley, and Donald Kennedy. “Antibiotics, Animals, and People: Again.” Science  





Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S. Code ch. 9 (1938). 
 
Glynn, M Kathleen, Cheryl Bopp, Wallis Dewitt, Paul Dabney, Mohammad Mokhtar, and  
Frederick J Angulo. “Emergence of Multidrug-Resistant Salmonella enterica 
SerotypeTyphimurium DT104 Infections in the United States.” N Engl J Med 338.19 
(1998): 1333–39. doi:10.1056/NEJM199805073381901. 
 
Guest, Gerald B. “Status of FDA's Program on the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feeds.” Journal  




Gustafson, R.H., and R.E. Bowen. “Antibiotic Use in Animal Agriculture.” Journal of Applied  
Microbiology 83 (1997): 531-541. doi:	10.1046/j.1365-2672.1997.00280.x.  
 
Hantke-Domas, Michael. “The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or  
Misinterpretation?” European Journal of Law and Economics 15.1 (2003): 165–94.  
doi:10.1023/A:1021814416688. 
 
Hileman, Bette. “Furor Over Animal Antibiotic Use.” Chemical & Engineering News 79.8  
(2001): 47. doi: 10.1021/cen-v079n008.p047. 
 
Hill, Howard. “Opposing view on food safety: Don’t bar animal antibiotics.” USA Today. July  
11, 2010. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-07-12-
editorial12_ST1_N.htm.    
 
Holmberg, S., J. Wells, and M. Cohen. “Animal-to-Man Transmission of Antimicrobial- 
Resistant Salmonella: Investigations of U.S. Outbreaks, 1971-1983.” Science 225.4664 
(1984): 833–35. doi:10.1126/science.6382605.  
 
Holmberg, Scott D., Michael T. Osterholm, Kenneth A. Senger, and Mitchell L. Cohen. “Drug- 
Resistant Salmonella from Animals Fed Antimicrobials.” New England Journal of 
Medicine 311.10 (1984): 617-622. 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM198409063111001.  
 
Institute of Medicine. Committee on Human Health Risk Assessment of Using Subtherapeutic  
Antibiotics in Animal Feeds. Human Health Risks with the Subtherapeutic Use of 




International Feed Industry Federation. International Feed Industry Federation Annual Report,  
2014/15. Accessed April 22, 2016. http://annualreport.ifif.org/. 
 
Jarvis, Lisa. “Antibiotic Feed Additives Under Review by FDA.” Chemical Market Reporter  





Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future. Feed for Food-Producing Animals: A Resource on  
Ingredients, the Industry, and Regulation by Lisa Y. Lefferts, Margaret Kucharski, 




Joskow, Paul L. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of  




Jukes, Thomas H. “Antibiotics in Animal Feeds and Animal Production”. Bioscience 22.9  
(1972): 526–34. doi:10.2307/1296312.  
 
Kar, Avinash. “An update on NRDC court wins on antibiotic use in livestock: FDA appeals the  
decisions.” NRDC Expert Blog, October 15, 2012. https://www.nrdc.org/experts/avinash-
kar/update-nrdc-court-wins-antibiotic-use-livestock-fda-appeals-decisions. 
 
Kux, Leslie. Leslie Kux to Sarah Klein. “Re: Re: Original Docket No. 99P-0485/CP.” November  
7, 2011. http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/citizen-petition-1999-denial.pdf. 
 
Kux, Leslie. Leslie Kux to Andrew Maguire. “Re: Original Docket No. 05P-0139/CP.”  
November 7, 2011. http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/denial-of-2005-petition.pdf. 
 
Lawrence, William L. “‘Wonder Drug’ Aureomycin found to Spur Growth 50%." New York  
Times, Apr 10, 1950. http://search.proquest.com/docview/111443820?accountid=15172.  
 





Magat, Wesley A., Alan J. Krupnick, and Winston Harrington (1986). Rules in the Making: A  
Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior. Washington, DC: Resources for the  
Future. 
 
Marshall, E. “Health Committee Investigates Farm Drugs. Proposed Legislation Would Enable  
FDA to Ban the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feeds.” Science 209.4455 (1980): 481–82.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1685114.  
 
Marwick, Charles. “Animal Feed Antibiotic Use Raises Drug Resistance Fear.” JAMA 282.2  
(1999): 120–22. doi:10.1001/jama.282.2.120-JMN0714-4-1.  
 
McBournie, Alaina Busch. “Groups Press Presidential Advisors to Nudge FDA on Animal  






Migué, Jean-Luc, Gérard Bélanger, and William A Niskanen. “Toward a General Theory of  
Managerial Discretion.” Public Choice 17.1 (1974): 27–47. doi:10.1007/BF01718995. 
 
Mirasol, Feliza. “Ban on Animal Feed Antibiotics Opens Door to New Alternatives.” Chemical  
Market Reporter 257.11 (2000): 14.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/194732929?accountid=15172.  
 
Moe, Terry M. “An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance.’”  
Legislative Studies Quarterly 12.4 (1987): 475–520. http://www.jstor.org/stable/439745. 
 
Muirhead, Sarah. “Structure of Feed Industry Has Evolved to Meet Needs of Producers,  
Consumers; From a User of By-products to a Science-based Industry.” Feedstuffs 75.34  
(2003). 
 
National Chicken Council. “Chicken Council Supports Responsible Antibiotic Use, Veterinary  
Oversight.” June 2, 2015. http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/chicken-council-
supports-responsible-antibiotic-use-veterinary-oversight/. 
 
National Chicken Council. “NCC Statement on FDA Final Guidance #213 and Veterinary Feed  
Directive Proposal.” December 11, 2013. http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/ncc-
statement-fda-final-guidance-213-veterinary-feed-directive-proposal/. 
 
National Research Council. Committee to Study the Human Health Effects of Subtherapeutic  
Antibiotic Use. The Effects on Human Health of Subtherapeutic Use of Antimicrobials in  
Animal Feeds. Report. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1980. 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21.html.  
 
Natural Resources Defense Council, INC., et al. v. United States Food and Drug Administration.  





Natural Resources Defense Council, INC., et al. v. United States Food and Drug Administration.  





Natural Resources Defense Council, INC., et al. v. United States Food and Drug Administration.  







North American Meat Institute. “AMI Statement on FDA Guidance 213 and Proposed VFD  
Rule.” December 11, 2013. 
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=d/ReleaseDetails/i/96139. 
 
O'Brien, T.F., J.D. Hopkins, and E.S. Gilleece. “Molecular Epidemiology of Antibiotic  
Resistance in Salmonella From Animals and Human Beings in the United States.” New 
England Journal of Medicine 307.1 (1982): 1-6. 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM198207013070101.  
 
Olson, Mary. “Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives.” Journal of  
Law, Economics, and Organization 12.2 (1996): 376–407. 
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/2/376.full.pdf.  
 
Olson, Mary. “Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance.”  
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15.3 (1999): 573–601. 
doi:10.1093/jleo/15.3.573.  
 
“Push to Ban Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed Gains Momentum.” Chemical Market Reporter  
255.12 (1999): 17. http://search.proquest.com/docview/194747376?accountid=15172. 
 
Rhinelander, David H. “Study Finds Danger in Routine Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed.” The  
Hartford Courant. March 5, 1987. 
 
Reuters. “FDA set to approve controversial cow drug: report.” March 5, 2007.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-antibiotic-cattle-idUSN0318513320070305.   
 
Sapkota, Amy R., Lisa Y. Lefferts, Shawn McKenzie, and Polly Walker. “What Do We Feed to  
Food-production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed Ingredients and Their Potential 
Impacts on Human Health”. Environmental Health Perspectives 115 (5) (2007): 663–70. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4489010.  
 
Schneider, Keith. “FDA Faulted in Threat From Animal Drugs.” New York Times. January 13,  
1986. http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/shared/controller/permalink.do.  
 
Schneider, Keith. “Should Farmers Go Cold Turkey?” New York Times. January 19, 1986.  
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/shared/controller/permalink.do.  
 
Silbergeld, Ellen K., Jay Graham, and Lance B. Price. “Industrial Food Animal Production,  
Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health.” Annual Review of Public Health (2008) 
29: 153. doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.29.020907.090904.  
 
Slaughter, Louise. “Rep. Slaughter, Only Microbiologist in Congress, Responds to  







Smith, Kirk E, John M Besser, Craig W Hedberg, Fe T Leano, Jeffrey B Bender, Julie H  
Wicklund, Brian P Johnson, Kristine A Moore, and Michael T Osterholm. “Quinolone- 
Resistant Campylobacter jejuniInfections in Minnesota, 1992–1998.” N Engl J Med 
340.20 (1999): 1525–32. doi:10.1056/NEJM199905203402001. 
 
Stigler, George J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and  
Management Science 2.1 (1971): 3–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003160. 
 
Sun, Marjorie. “Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed Challenged.” Science 226.4671 (1984): 144– 
46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1693443.  
 
Taylor, Michael R. “Re: Docket No. FDA-2009-P-0594.” U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  








Trust for America’s Health. "Trust for America's Health Statement on the Food and Drug  
Administration's Guidance Documents 209 and 213 and Veterinary Feed Directive 
Proposed Rule on Antibiotic use in Food Animals." PR Newswire, Apr 11, 2012. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/993158879?accountid=15172.  
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Antibiotic  
Resistance and the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Agriculture: Hearings before the 




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.  
Antibiotics in Animal Feed: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and  




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.  
Antibiotics in Animal Feed: Hearings on H.R. 7285, Before the Subcommittee on Health  












U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Science and Technology. Antibiotic  
Resistance: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. 98th 




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Government Operations. Regulation of  
Animal Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration. 99th Cong., 1st sess. July 24 and 
July 25, 1985. http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-
1985-oph-0062?accountid=15172.  
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural  
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Government Appropriations. Human  




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural  
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural  
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 




U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural  
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 




U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Drugs in Livestock Feed (Washington, DC:  





U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural Development and  





U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food  
and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2013. 112th Cong., 




U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Antibiotic Resistance. 106th Cong., 2nd  




U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food  
and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008.  




U.S. Department of Agriculture. Economic Research Service. Briefing Paper: Food and Drug  
Administration Proposal to Restrict the Use of Selected Antibiotics at Subtherapeutic  
Levels in Animal Feeds, by Clark R. Burbee, Robert Lenahan, and George Allen. ERS-




U.S. Department of Agriculture. Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service. “The  
Economic Effects of a Prohibition on the Use of Selected Animal Drugs.” September 
1978. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Unified National  
Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations (Washington, DC 1999). 
http://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/finafost.pdf. 
 




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Center for Veterinary Medicine. “General Review and  
Enforcement Policies: Regulating Animal Foods with Drug Claims.” In Center for 







U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Internal Strategy Memos Released Under Freedom of  
Information Act (2012). 
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/fda/10_17_12_FDA_strategy_memos.pdf. 
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Draft Guidance for Industry 78: Evaluation of the Human  
Health Impact of the Microbial Effects of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs Intended for 
Use in Food-Producing Animals (November 1998). 
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Guidance for Industry 213: New Animal Drugs and New  
Animal Drug Combination Products Administered in or on Medicated Feed or Drinking 
Water of Food-Producing Animals: Recommendations for Drug Sponsors for Voluntarily 




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States  
Food and Drug Administration and the Association of American Feed Control Officials. 




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Transcript of the Official Meeting of the Veterinary  
Medicine Advisory Committee, New Drug Microbial Safety Review Under Guidance  
#152. September 25, 2006. 
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedic
ineAdvisoryCommittee/ucm126971.htm#Importance of Cephalosporins.   
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Penicillin-Containing Premixes, Opportunity for  




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and  
Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes; Opportunity for Hearing.” Federal Register 42, 




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Guidance for Industry: Evaluation of the Human  
Health Impact of the Microbial Effects of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs Intended for 
Use in Food-Producing Animals; Availability.” Federal Register 63, no. 222 (November 





U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Discussion Paper: A Proposed Framework for  
Evaluating and Assuring the Human Safety of the Microbial Effects of Antimicrobial 
New Animal Drugs Intended for Use in Food-Producing Animals; Availability.” Federal 
Register 64, no. 3 (January 6, 1999): 887. https://federalregister.gov/a/98-34842.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Guidance for Industry: Consideration of the  
Human Health Impact of the Microbial Effects of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs 
Intended for Use in Food-Producing Animals (GFI #78); Availability.” Federal Register 
64, no. 242 (December 17, 1999): 70715. https://federalregister.gov/a/99-32313.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Enrofloxacin for Poultry; Opportunity For  
Hearing,” Federal Register 65, no. 211 (October 31, 2000): 64954. 
https://federalregister.gov/a/00-27832.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Discussion Paper: An Approach for Establishing  
Thresholds in Association With the Use of Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing 
Animals; Availability.” Federal Register 65, no. 251 (December 29, 2000): 83070. 
https://federalregister.gov/a/00-33215.  
 
U.S Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Draft Guidance for Industry: Evaluating the Safety  
of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs With Regard to Their Microbiological Effects on 
Bacteria of Human Health Concern; Availability.” Federal Register 67, no. 178 
(September 13, 2002): 58058. https://federalregister.gov/a/02-23387.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Guidance for Industry: Evaluating the Safety of  
Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs With Regard to Their Microbiological Effects on 
Bacteria of Human Health Concern; Availability.” Federal Register 68, no. 207 (October 
27, 2003): 61221. https://federalregister.gov/a/03-27113.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Veterinary Feed Directive.” Federal Register 75,  
no. 59 (March 29, 2010): 15387. https://federalregister.gov/a/2010-6872.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Draft Guidance: The Judicious Use of Medically  
Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals; Availability.” Federal 
Register 75, no. 124 (June 29, 2010): 37450. https://federalregister.gov/a/2010-15289.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Withdrawal of Notices of Opportunity for a  
Hearing; Penicillin and Tetracycline Used in Animal Feed.” Federal Register 76, no. 246  
(December 22, 2011): 79697. https://federalregister.gov/a/2011-32775.   
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Notice. “Guidance for Industry on the Judicious Use of  
Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals; Availability.” 
Federal Register 77, no. 72 (April 13, 2012): 22328. https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-
8846.  
 




Drugs and New Animal Drug Combination Products Administered in or on Medicated 
Feed or Drinking Water of Food-Producing Animals: Recommendations for Drug 
Sponsors for Voluntarily Aligning Product Use Conditions With GFI #209; Availability.” 
Federal Register 77, no. 72 (April 13, 2012): 22327. https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-
8845.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Proposed Rule. “New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal  
Feeds: Animal Feeds Containing Penicillin and Tetracycline.” Federal Register 42, no. 




U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Proposed Rule. “Veterinary Feed Directive; Draft Text for  
Proposed Regulation,” Federal Register 77, no. 72 (April 13, 2012): 22247. 
https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-8844.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Rule. “Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related Products;  
Enrofloxacin for Poultry; Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug Application.” 
Federal Register 70, no. 146 (August 1, 2005): 44048. https://federalregister.gov/a/05-
15223.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Rule. “New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs;  
Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Order of Prohibition.” Federal Register 73, no. 129 (July 3, 
2008): 38110. https://federalregister.gov/a/E8-15052.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Rule. “New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs;  
Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Revocation of Order of Prohibition; Withdrawal.” Federal 
Register 73, no. 229 (November 26, 2008): 71923. https://federalregister.gov/a/E8-28093.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Rule. “New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs;  
Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Order of Prohibition.” Federal Register 77, no. 4 (January  
6, 2012): 735. https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-35.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Rule. “Veterinary Feed Directive,” Federal Register 80, no.  
106 (June 3, 2015): 31707. https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-13393.  
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Antibiotic Resistance: Federal Agencies Need to Better Focus  
Efforts to Address Risk to Humans from Antibiotic Use in Animals. GAO-04-490. 
Washington, DC, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04490.pdf.  
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Food Safety: The Agricultural Use of Antibiotics and its  
Implications for Human Health. GAO-99-74. Washington, DC, 1999. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/227223.pdf.  
 
Wallinga, David. Playing Chicken: Avoiding Arsenic in Your Meat. Institute for Agriculture and  





Walton, Susan. “FDA Stymied on Antibiotic Ban.” BioScience 30.5 (1980): 295–96.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1307850.  
 
Washington Post. “FDA Approves Antibiotic for Chickens; Drug Aimed at Preventing the  
Spread of Deadly E. Coli Bacteria.” August 19, 1995. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/307856276?accountid=15172.  
 
Wehr, Elizabeth. “Drugs Losing Punch in Humans: FDA [Food and Drug Administration],  
Dingell Seek Ban on Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed.” Congressional Quarterly  
Weekly Report 38 (1980): 1880–81. 
 




Western Farm Press. “Feed Industry Supports FDAas Antibiotic Stance.” April 13, 2012.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1009076247?accountid=15172.  
 
Western Farm Press. “FDA antibiotics guidance tough on pork producers.” April 13, 2012.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1009074827?accountid=15172.  
 
White, David G. “Keeping You Informed: An Update on FDA’s Judicious Use Strategy for  




The White House. “National Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.”  




The White House. National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria. Washington,  
DC: September 2014. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb_national_strategy.pdf.  
 
The White House. Private Sector Factsheet: More than 150 Animal and Health Stakeholders ‘ 
Join White House Effort to Combat Antibiotic Resistance. June 2, 2015.  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/060215_private_sector_factsheet.pdf  
 
World Health Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Codex  
Alimentarius Commission. Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (Rome 2004). 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/Booklets/Animal/Animal_Food_Prod_EN.pdf. 
 






Wu, Mae. “More Action Needed in National Action Plan for Combatting Antibiotic Resistant  
Bacteria.” NRDC Expert Blog, March 27, 2015. https://www.nrdc.org/experts/mae-
wu/more-action-needed-national-action-plan-combating-antibiotic-resistant-bacteria. 
 
Wu, Mae. “White House Misses Golden Opportunity to Push for Meat Raised Without Abusing  




Yackee, Susan Webb. “Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: the Influence of Interest Group  
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking.” Journal of Public Administration Research  
and Theory 16.1 (2006): 103–24. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mui042.  
 
 
